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"The present workers' compensation system is in
very deep trouble. Nobody really knows the exact
amount of the system's unfunded liability.
Estimates range anywhere from 1.8 billion dollars
to more than two billion dollars."
I. INTRODUCTION
The workers' compensation system is a statutory creature that was designed "to assure the quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits to injured workers at a reasonable cost to employers,... recognizing that the
, system.., is based on a mutual renunciation of common law rights and defenses by employers and employees alike." 2 The national legislative impetus
for creating workers' compensation schemes was fueled by the fiery realization
that "[t]he common law system governing the remedy of workers against employers for injuries received in employment [was] inconsistent with modem
industrial conditions." 3 In the final analysis, the inadequacy of common law
remedies for employment injuries necessitated legislative intervention and innoState ex rel. McKenzie v. Smith, 569 S.E.2d 809, 827 (W. Va. 2002) (Maynard, J., dissenting).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-40-102(1) (2003). See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-101(b) (LexisNexis
2002) ("The primary purposes of the workers' compensation laws are to pay timely temporary and
permanent disability benefits to all legitimately injured workers who suffer an injury or disease
arising out of and in the course of their employment, to pay reasonable and necessary medical
expenses resulting therefrom, and then to return the worker to the work force; to improve workplace safety through safety programs; to improve health care delivery through use of managed
care concepts; [and] to encourage the return to work of injured workers .....
3
WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 51.04.010 (West 2002).
2

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2004

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 107, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 6
[Vol. 107

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

vation, which culminated
in the creation of a workers' compensation system in
4
all jurisdictions.
The creative spirit that carved out the workers' compensation system
did not envision the eventual abuse that would plague the system. This unfortu-

nate oversight proved to be detrimental to the economic health of every workers' compensation system in the nation. Wholesale abuse of workers' compensation systems in all jurisdictions has nearly bankrupted entitlements for future
generations. 5 As one state legislature put it, "abuse and misuse of the workers'
compensation system has brought discredit on the system and its participants...
and has endangered the stability and fiscal health of the system ....

,6

See generally, ALA. CODE §§ 25-5-1 to 25-5-340 (2000); ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.30.005 to
23.30.400 (LexisNexis 2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-901 to 23-1091 (West 1995); ARK.
CODE ANN.§§ 11-9-101 to 11-9-1001 (Michie 2002); CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3200 to 6149 (Deering
2003); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-40-101 to 8-55-104 (2003); CON. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-275 to
31-355b (West 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 2101 to 2397 & tit. 18, §§ 2601 to 2622 (1995);
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 32-1501 to 32-1545 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 440.01 to 440.60 (West
2003); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 34-9-1 to 34-9-421 (2004); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 386-1 to 386-214
(1993); IDAHO CODE §§ 72-101 to 72-929 (Michie 1999); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/1 to
305/30 (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3-1-1 to 22-3-12-5 (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 85.1 to 87.24 (West 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-501 to 44-5a22 (2000); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 342.0011 to 342.990 (Michie 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN, §§ 23:1021 to 23:1415 (West
1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, §§ 101 to 909 (West 2001); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. &
EMPL. §§ 9-101 to 9-1201 (1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 152, §§ 1 to 86 (Law. Co-op. 2000);
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 418.1 to 418.941 (2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 175A.01 to 176.86 (West
1993); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 71-3-1 to 71-3-181 (1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 287.010 to 287.975
(West 1993); MONT.CODE ANN. §§ 39-71-101 to 39-71-2914 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-101
to 48-1,118 (1998); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 616A.005 to 617.510 (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
281-A:1 to 281-A:70 (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:15-1 to 34:15-142 (West 2000); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 52-1-1 to 52-10-1 (Michie 2003); N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW §§ I to 14a (McKinney
1992), §§ 15 to 49hh (McKinney 1993) & §§ 50 to 328 (McKinney 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
97-1 to 97-200 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-01-01 to 65-10-03 (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 4121.01 to 4123.99 (Anderson 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, §§ I to 211 (West 1992); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 656.001 to 656.990 (2003); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 1 to 2626 (West 2002); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 28-29-1 to 28-38-25 (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-1-10 to 42-19-50 (Law. Co-op.
1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 62-1-1 to 62-9-15 (Michie 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 50-6-101
to 50-6-705 (1999); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 401.001 to 506-001 (Vernon 1996); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 34A-2-101 to 34A-4-102 (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 601 to 711 (1987); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 65.2-100 to 65.2-1310 (Michie 2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 51.04.010 to
51.98.080 (West 2002); W. VA. CODE §§ 23-1-1 to 23-6-1 (Michie Supp. 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 102.01 to 102.89 (West 2004); WYO.STAT. ANN. §§ 27-14-101 to 27-14-805 (Michie 2003).
See also, Federal 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101 to 8193 (2000), & 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 to 950 (2000).

4

For a general discussion see, Daniel L. Driscoll and Raymond P. Green, Workers' Compensation:Proposed Curesfor Runaway Costs, 68 N.Y. ST. B.J. 36 (1996); Gary T. Schwartz, Waste,
Fraud,and Abuse in Workers' Compensation: The Recent CaliforniaExperience, 52 MD. L. REV.
983 (1993).
6
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-29-1.2(a)(4) (2003). See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 11 -9-101 (b) (Michie
5

2002) ("[T]he workers' compensation system in this state must be returned to a state of economic
viability.").
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Meaningful efforts to halt unbridled abuse of the workers' compensation system did not take hold until the start of the 1990's. 7 As if struck by the
same bolt of fiscal enlightenment, states all across the nation simultaneously
"to bring the system into
began implementing prudent initiatives in the 1990's
8

balance and eliminate waste and unnecessary costs."
West Virginia was not immune from the fiscal crisis that threatened
workers' compensation schemes throughout the nation. Indeed, major changes

to the state's workers' compensation laws were enacted by the legislature during
the 1990's. 9 Those changes were designed to assure that present and future

workers would have adequate remedies for work-related injuries and diseases.
However, unlike a growing minority of states, 10 during the 1990's reform the
West Virginia legislature did not specifically address the expansive and abusive

use of the rule of liberality in workers' compensation litigation."1

Piecemeal efforts at reform predated the national systemic reforms of the 1990's. See generally, Susan B. Fellman, Workers' Compensation: Causationfor Mental and Cardiovascular
Disability under the 1980 Amendment to Section 301, 1983 DET. C.L. REV. 143 (1983); H. Alston
Johnson, Bound in Shallows and Miseries: The 1983 Amendments to the Workers' Compensation
Statute, 44 LA. L. REv. 669 (1984); John V. Keaney, What Have the States Done to Improve Their
Workmen's Compensation Systems? 1 WORKERS' Comp. L. REV. 283 (1974); Keith C. Miller,
Problems of Workers' CompensationFederalization, 30 DRAKE L. REV. 779 (1981).
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-29-1.2(a)(6) (1995). One commentator succinctly stated the matter as
8
7

follows: "The workers' compensation system in the United States is in trouble. The total cost of
the program in 1988 was about $43 billion and rising fast. Premium levels nationwide are rising at
10 to 11 percent annually, and the total cost was expected to have reached $60 billion in 1990."
John G. Kilgour, Workers' Compensation Problems and Solutions: The CaliforniaExperience, 43
LAB, L.J. 84, 84 (1992). For a discussion of reform efforts by specific jurisdictions see John D.
Copeland, The New Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act: Did the Pendulum Swing Too Far? 47
ARK. L. REV. 1 (1994); Aya V. Matsumoto, Rejorming the Reform: Mental Stress Claims Under
California's Workers' Compensation System, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1327 (1994); Timothy A.
Watson & Michael J. Valen, A Historic Review of Workers' Compensation Reform in Florida, 21
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 501 (1993); Erik E. Highberg, Reforming Oregon Workers' Compensation
Law: Temporary Relieffor Insurers, 27 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 81 (1991); Patrick J. Platter, 1990
Amendments to the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, 47 J. Mo. BAR 343 (1991); Kelly
Morgan Greenough, Workers' Compensation Reform in Oklahoma: Exclusion of lnjuries Sustained at Recreational or Social Events, 26 TULSA L.J. 405 (1991); William 0. Ashcraft & Anita
M. Alessandra, A Review of the New Texas Workers' Compensation System, 21 TEX. TEcH L.
REv. 609 (1990).
See Emily A. Spieler, Assessing Fairness in Workers' Compensation Reform: A Commentary on the 1995 West Virginia Workers' Compensation Legislation, 98 W.VA. L. REV. 23 (1995);
see also Bryan R. Cokeley, West Virginia's New Workers' Compensation Anti-Discrimination
Provision: The Road to Court is Paved with Good Intentions, 94 W.VA. L. REV. 725 (1992).
See infra note 276.
t
9

It was correctly pointed out in McCoy v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 119 A. 484, 485 (Pa.
1923), that "'[bloth the courts and administrative authorities have,., been most liberal in constru(quoting, Fink v. Sheldon Axle & Spring Co., 113
ing the Workmen's Compensation Law.
A. 666, 667 (Pa. 1921)).
"
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The state legislature's sweeping changes in the 1990's failed. The workers' compensation system has continued its steady course toward bankruptcy.
As a result of the bleak fiscal future of the system, in 2003 the legislature returned to the drawing board in an attempt to salvage the near-bankrupt system.
One of the critical changes attempted by the legislature in 2003 was that of abolishing the use of the rule of liberality in workers' compensation litigation.
The intent of this article is twofold: (1) to provide an assessment of the
impact of expansive and abusive use of the rule of liberality in workers' compensation litigation in West Virginia and (2) to assess the legal effectiveness of
the legislature's attempt to abolish the rule of liberality in 2003. In the final
analysis, this article will show that abusive use of the rule of liberality played a
major role in gutting the reform measures of the 1990's. The article will also
show that in abolishing the rule of liberality in 2003 the legislature, through an
apparent lack of understanding of the rule, has actually again codified the rule of
liberality in workers' compensation litigation.
In Part II of this article a brief summary of the international origin of
workers' compensation is provided. The creation of workers' compensation in
West Virginia is examined in Part III. In Part IV a discussion of the current
workers' compensation litigation scheme is provided. The article next examines,
in Part V, the key players in the state workers' compensation system and the
reform measures of the 1990's that were designed to curtail abuse of the system
by those players. The development of the rule of liberality in the state is discussed in Part VI. In Part VII an assessment is provided of the impact of abusive
application of the rule of liberality in workers' compensation litigation. Efforts
by the legislature in 2003 to abolish the rule of liberality are addressed in Part
VIII.
II. INTERNATIONAL ORIGIN OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION

Workers' compensation
is not an American creation, nor is its roots em12
provides
a summary of the
law.
This
of the articlelaws.
bedded
in
the
common
13
compensation
international beginnings of workers'part

12

In fact, workers' compensation is a "derogation of the doctrine of the common law that

negligence or wrongful acts proximately causing ... injuries were [sic.] the only just foundation
of legal liability for such injuries." Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. King, 164 So. 760, 761 (Ala.
1935).
13
It was said appropriately by two commentators that "the establishment of [workers'] compensation schemes in America can be viewed as a case of cross-cultural influence." Lawrence M.
Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L.
REv. 50, 72 (1967).
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IndustrialRevolution Spawned CompensationLaws

A.

The court in Mosley v. Figliuzzi14 observed in passing that "as the industrial revolution accelerated through the 19th century ... [workers] were be-5
ing pushed out of family farms and other family enterprises into the factories."'
Mechanization, assembly lines, and
mass production fueled what has become
16
revolution.
industrial
the
known as
Prior to the industrial revolution, the livelihood of the vast majority of
the world's population was dependent upon agrarian economies. 17 One of the
positive intangibles derived from agrarian economies was the minimalization of
injuries to workers. 18 As a result of the extremely low injury rate associated with
farm work, there was never a need to create a specific system to address the
societies, courts took care
consequences of injuries to workers. 19 In developed
2
0
of any complaints derived from worker injuries.
The industrial revolution transformed the employment injury landscape.
"[T]he industrial revolution spawned so many workplace accidents and lawsuits, '2 1 that it became imperative to create a specific mechanism to address the
accimassive problems attributed to worker injuries. The solution to industrial
22
dents was "a system of compensation for employees injured on the job."

14

930 P.2d 1110 (Nev. 1997).

15

Id. at 1117.

16

See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 13, at 52, where the authors note that "[d]uring the

industrial revolution, the size of the factory labor force increased, [and] the use of machinery in
the production of goods became more widespread .. "
17

See generally, Arthur Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37

CORNELL L.Q. 206,221-28 (1952).

18 Id. at 222 ("So far as law on the subject of master's liability to his injured servant is concerned, the period from 1000-1837 A.D. seems to be a complete blank.").
19

Id.

20

Id. at 222-28.

21

Bell v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co. of Des Moines, 541 N.W.2d 824, 835 (Wis. 1995)

(Sundby, J., dissenting); See also Richard C. Edwards, Workmen's Compensation: The Needfor

Reform, 1973 U. ILL. L. FORUM 563, 563 (1973), reprinted in 2 WORKERS' COMp.. L. REv. 595
(1975) ("One side effect of the industrialization and mechanization of commerce and manufacturing was the great increase in work-related injuries.").
22
Bell, 541 N.W.2d at 835. See Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907, 911 (W.
Va. 1978) ("The [Workers'] Compensation Act was designed to remove negligently caused industrial accidents from the common law tort system.").
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The Iron Chancellor's Gift to Workers of the World

Otto von Bismarck, the Iron Chancellor, unified and ruled the German
empire from 1871 to 1890. 23 During Bismarck's reign, Germany, like other
developed nations, was in the midst of the industrial revolution. 24 Thousands of
farm laborers were turning into factory laborers. 25 The irreversible trek from
farmlands to city factories carried with it a theretofore unthinkable consequence:
If a worker suffered a job injury that prevented temporary or permanent em26
ployment, the worker and his/herfamily were literally subject to starvation.
27
This brutal realization was rarely, if ever, a consequence for the farm worker.
Bismarck's Germany (and all industrialized nations) felt the harsh backlash of the industrial revolution, which resulted in injuries to many factory
workers. The nation's legal system provided relief for only a fraction of those
who were injured during the course of their employment. 29 Moreover, the proemployer stance
of the legal system resulted in whole families being thrown into
30
abject poverty.

One irony embedded in the dismal plight of injured German workers
was that employers were being ecstatically drowned in excess profits that resulted from "'the blood of the working man."' '31 Fortunately, through compassion, foresight or political pressure, Bismarck understood the desperate exis-

tence of injured workers and proposed a solution that would be heard and replicated around the world.32 In 1884, Bismarck convinced the German Reichstag
23

See Paul Raymond Gurtler, The Workers' Compensation Principle:A HistoricalAbstract of

the Nature of Workers' Compensation, 9 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 285, 288-90 (1989).
24
Id. at 290.
25

See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 13, at 51-54.

26

"[T]he pre-compensation loss-adjustment system for industrial accidents was a complete

failure and in most cases left the worker's family destitute." Larson, supra note 17, at 228; See
also Deborah Ballam, Assessing the Extent of the Quid Pro Quo in Workers' Compensation: The
Ohio Experience, 45 LAB. L.J. 131, 131 (1995) ("Because few workers could overcome the barriers to recovery presented by the common law, many received no compensation for their injuries,
and oftentimes their families were relegated to poverty.").
27
See Larson, supra note 17, at 222.
28

See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 13, at 60 (noting that by the start of the 1900's in the

United States alone there were annually 35,000 deaths and 2,000,000 injuries related to employment).
29
See Larson, supra note 17, at 224-25.
30

See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 13, at 65-66 (detailing the futile efforts of workers

who sought to recover from employers in litigation).
31

Smith v. Ford, 472 So.2d 1223, 1228 n.6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (citation omitted).

32

See Gurtler, supra note 23, at 290 (where it is argued that Bismarck was forced to initiate a

workers' compensation system in order to prevent socialists from taking over Germany).
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to pass "the world's first workers' compensation law."' 3 3 Like all compensation
schemes that would eventually follow, Bismarck's compensation system was
"an effort on the part of the [government] to insure the workman to a limited
extent against loss from accidents in his employment, to give him a speedy and
expeditious remedy for his injury,
and to place upon industry the burden of
34
losses incident to its conduct."
The workers' compensation system in Germany has been described as a
mutual association between employer and employee. Under the German system both the employer and employee contributed funds. 36 The German government supervised the system, but its administration was entrusted to representatives of employers and employees. 37 The system was divided into three types
of designated funds: (1) a sickness fund which paid benefits to employees during the first thirteen weeks of a work disability (the employer contributed only
one-third of the cost of operating this fund); (2) an accident fund which provided benefits after the expiration of the first thirteen weeks of a work disability
(the employer paid all of the operating costs of this fund); and (3) a disability
fund which paid benefits for disabilities attributed
to old age (the employer paid
38
one-half the operating costs of this fund).
C.

Other InternationalCompensationLaws

Bismarck's workers' compensation precedent did not go unnoticed on
the world stage. While workers' compensation systems did not settle on the
American continent until the twentieth century, 39 Bismarck's precedent landed
in other nations during the nineteenth century. 40 Nations that enacted workers'
compensation schemes in the nineteenth century included Austria (1887), Norway (1894), Finland (1895), England (1897), Denmark, France and Italy
(1898).41

33

Id. at 288.

34

Bristol Builders Supply Co. v. McReynolds, 162 S.E. 8, 9 (1932), (quoting Gobble v.
Clinch Valley Lumber Co., 127 S.E. 175, 176 (1925)).
35
Larson, supra note 17, at 230.
36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id.

39

See infra note 75.

40

See Gurtler, supra note 23, at 290.

41

Samuel B. Horovitz, Worldwide Workmen's Compensation Trends, 59 KY. L.J. 37, 40-41

(1970).
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England's Workmen's Compensation Act of 189742 "in many ways
served as the model for the subsequent American statutes." 43 A principal feature
of the English scheme that is found in American compensation laws is its liability formula: 'personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the
employers. 45
employment. "' England's compensation system was funded by

compensation systems in America are funded exclusively by emAll workers'
46
ployers.
42

See Steven W. Ford & James A. Abernathy, II, HistoricalDevelopment ofAlabama's Work-

ers' CompensationLaw: Remedies Existing Priorto Workers' Compensation Legislation, 61 ALA.
LAW. 48, 50 (2000) (providing brief discussion of the Act).
43
Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers' Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775, 797 (1982). It should be noted that prior to the Act of 1897,
England had created the Employers' Liability Act of 1880. This Act was a crude and unworkable
form of subsequent workers' compensation laws. Id. at 787-97.
44

Id. at 797 (quoting Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, 60 & 61 VICT., ch. 37, §1(1)

(Eng.)).
45

See Ford and Abernathy, supra note 42, at 50.

46

This point is significant because, as discussed in part VI, West Virginia's initial workers'
compensation system required both the employer and employee contribute monetarily to the system. Workers' compensation systems today are generally funded by employers in one of three
ways: (1) self-insure (including an employer pool), (2) pay premiums directly to a state fund, or
(3) insure through a private entity.
A minority of states allow employers to choose between all three methods of funding. See ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-961(A) (West Supp. 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-44-101(1) (2003);
IDAHO CODE § 72-301 (Michie 1999); MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 9-402(a) (1999); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 39-71-2101, 39-71-2201, & 39-71-2311 (2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-1-4, 52-54.1 & 52-9-4 (Michie 2003); N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW § 50 (West 1994); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
77, § 501(a)(1) (West 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-201(l) (2001).
A majority of states allow employers to choose between self-insuring or insuring with a private
entity. See ALA. CODE § 25-5-8 (2000); ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.075(a) (Michie 2000); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 11-9-404(a) (Michie 2002); CAL. LAB. CODE § 3700 (Deering 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 31-284(b) (West 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2372(a) (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 321534(a) (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.38(1) (West 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-121(a) (2004);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 386-121(a) (1993); 820 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 305/4 (West 1993); IND. CODE
ANN. § 22-3-5-1(a) (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 87.1 & 87.4 (West 1996); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 44-532(b) (2000); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 342.340(1) (Michie 1997); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 23:1168 (West 1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 403 (West 2001); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 25A (West Supp. 2002); MIcH. COM4P. LAWS § 418.611(1) (2001); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 176.181(2) (West 1993 & Supp. 2002); Miss. CODE ANN. § 71-3-75 (1995); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 287.280 (West 1993 & Supp. 2002); NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-145(1) (1998); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 281-A:5 (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-77 (West 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
97-93(a) (2003); NEY. REv. STAT. §§ 616B.050, 616B.300 & 616B.460 (2003); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 85, § 61 (West 1992 & Supp. 2004); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 656.012(a) & 656.017(b) (2003);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-36-1(a) (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-5-20 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp.
2001); S.D. COrMD LAWS §§ 62-5-2 & 62-5-4 (Michie 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-405(a)
(1999); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.003 (Vernon 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 687 (1987 &
Supp. 2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-801(A) (Michie 2001); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 102.28(2) (West
2004).
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III. CREATION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION IN WEST VIRGINIA

Today all workers and employers are familiar with West Virginia's
workers' compensation system. It is generally understood that matters arising
from a negligently caused, work-related injury are resolved through the state's
workers' compensation system. Of course, this situation was not always the
case. This part of the article will initially provide a review of how work-related
injuries were resolved prior to the state's adoption of a workers' compensation
system. Additionally, this part of the article will present some discussion on the
initial enactment of the state's workers' compensation system. Finally, some
comments will be provided concerning coverage exceptions and the types of
benefits provided.
A.

Pre-Workers' Compensation Employee-Employer Litigation

Prior to the year 1913, workers' compensation laws did not exist in
West Virginia. Remedies for employees injured during the course of employment were provided in civil court, under common law principles. Employers
were able to defend themselves from employee work-related injury lawsuits
through the use of common law defenses that, if proven, absolved employers of
liability to their employees. Some comments regarding the rights of employees
and employers will be provided separately.
1.

Employee Rights Under the Common Law

The issue of an employer's liability to an employee for a negligently
caused employment injury was succinctly set out in Madden v. C. & 0. Railway
Co.47 In that case the supreme court held that "under the common law . . . a
master is liable to his servant for any neglect of the master's duty, whether
committed by the master himself or by one to whom he had delegated his au,48
In a later case the supreme court pointed out that "it is not enough
thority.
Three states allow employers to self-insure or to pay premiums directly to a state fund. See OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.35 (Anderson 2001); WASH. RnV. CODE ANN. § 51.14.010 (West 2002);
W. VA. CODE §§ 23-2-1(a) & 23-2-9 (Michie 2002 & Supp. 2004).
Two states require employers to pay premiums to their state funds only. See N.D. CENT. CODE §
65-04-04 (1995); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-207 (Michie 1997). The federal government provides for self-insurance through congressional appropriations. See 5 U.S.C. § 8147 (2000).
47

28 W. Va. 610 (1886),

48
Id. at 616-17. The Supreme Court, in Daniel v. C. & 0. Ry. Co., 15 S.E. 162 (W. Va. 1892),
restated Madden's summation of the duties owed by employers to employees:
(1) To provide safe and suitable machinery and appliances for the business (including a safe place to work). This includes the exercise of reasonable care in
furnishing such appliances, and the exercise of like care in keeping the same in
repair and making proper inspections and tests. (2) To exercise like care in
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simply that an accident occurred[,] it must be attributable to the [employer's]
negligence . . ."49 If an employee successfully established the liability of an
employer for an injury sustained during the course of employment, the employee could recover "the expense of his cure, the value of the time lost by him
during his cure, and a fair compensation for his physical and mental suffering
caused by
the injury as well as for any permanent reduction of his power to earn
50
money."
In the case of Cooper v. Pittsburgh, Cincinnatti & St. Louis Railroad
Co.,5 1 the supreme court indicated that an employee, injured by faulty equipment of an employer, could maintain an action against the employer even
though the employer gave absolute control of the business to an agent. 52 The
issue of defective equipment was also addressed in Berns v. Gaston Gas Coal
Co.,53 in the context of an employee's knowledge of the defect. It was said in
Berns that "if the servant knows the defect and has reasonable ground[s] to believe, that the master has cured or will immediately cure the54defect, he ...may
recover for injury caused by such negligence of the master."
providing and retaining sufficient and suitable servants for the business (and
instructing those who, from newness or age, evidently need it). (3) To establish
proper rules and regulations for the service, and, having adopted such, to conform to them.
Daniel, 15 S.E. at 167, (quoting Madden, 28 W. Va. at 617) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Haney v. Pitt., Cin., Chi. & St. Louis Ry. Co., 18 S.E. 748 (W. Va. 1893) (finding employer
liable to estate of deceased employee for injuries caused by negligence of employer's train conductor); Trump v. Tidewater Coal & Coke Co., 32 S.E. 1035 (W. Va. 1899) (affirming judgment
for employee where it was shown employer failed to properly train employee and provided defective equipment); Giebell v. The Collins Co., 46 S.E. 569 (W. Va. 1904) (affirming judgment for
employee where employer failed to properly train employee); Fulton v. Crosby & Beckley Co., 49
S.E. 1012 (W. Va. 1905) (affirming judgment for employee injured on employer's defective
bridge).
49
Humphreys v. Newport News & M.V. Co., 10 S.E. 39, 43 (W. Va. 1889) (citations omitted).
50

Riley v. W. Va. Cent. & Pac. Ry. Co., 27 W. Va. 145, 161 (1885) (citations omitted).

51

24 W. Va. 37 (1884).

52

"Where a master places the entire charge of his business, or a distinct department of it, in

the hands of an agent, exercising no discretion and no oversight of his own, it is manifest that the
neglect of the agent, of ordinary care in supplying and maintaining suitable instrumentalities for
the work required to be done is a breach of duty for which the master should be held liable. In
such a case the negligence of the agent is the negligence of the principal." Cooper, 24 W. Va. at
51 (citations omitted). See also Gregory v. Ohio River R.R. Co., 16 S.E. 819, 821 (W. Va. 1893)
("[T]he test of liability of the principal is not whether the agent was authorized to do the particular
act which constitutes the negligence or causes the injury, or whether itwas done in violation of the
principal's orders, but whether it was done while he was engaged in his principal's business,
within the scope of his authority.").
53

27 W. Va. 285 (1885).

Id. at 300. See Madden v. C. & 0. Ry. Co., 28 W. Va. 610, 621 (1886), 28 W. Va. at 612
("The law is well settled ...that the company is bound not only to provide safe and suitable ma54
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From a practical standpoint, the common law right of an employee to
sue an employer for a negligently caused work injury was a hollow right. This
right did not carry with it a guarantee of a positive litigation outcome for the
employee. In the final analysis, the vast majority of injured employees in the
state did not obtain legal redress against employers.55 The dismal legal plight of
injured employees was attributed, in large measure, to the common law defenses
employers had at their disposal.
2.

Employer Defenses Under the Common Law

As a general proposition, it was held in Berns that "[t]he measure of
care, which a master must take to avoid responsibility for injury to his servant, is
that, which a person of ordinary prudence and caution would use, if his own
interests were to be affected ....,56 An extension of the latter principle was
stated in Hoffman v. Dickinson.57 In Hoffman, the supreme court held:
A servant can not recover for an injury suffered in the course of
his employment, for a defect in the machinery or appliances
used by the master, unless the master knew, or ought to have
known, of the defect, and the servant was ignorant of such defeet, or had not equal means of knowledge.

chinery and appliances for its business, but it must exercise reasonable care in keeping the same in
repair.").
Although statistical data of the success rate of injured employees in actions against employers are not available, other evidence exists which suggest that employees did not frequently prevail against employers. For example, Chapter 57 of the Acts of 1899 created three hospitals specifically for injured workers. 1899 W. VA. ACTS ch. 57 (codified as W. VA. CODE §§ 467-477
(1906)). It was provided in W. VA. CODE § 471, that the three hospitals had "to treatfree of
charge persons accidentally injured, in this State, while engaged in their usual employment or
occupation...." (emphasis added). Presumptively free medical care would not have to be provided by the state, if injured employees routinely prevailed against employers. See Friedman &
Ladinsky, supra note 13, at 65-66 ("Relatively few injured workers received compensation....
When an employee did recover, the amount was usually small. . . .Litigation costs consumed
much of whatever was recovered.").
56
27 W. Va. at 300.
55

57

6 S.E. 53 (W. Va. 1888).

Id. at 59. (citations omitted). Accord Johnson v. C. & 0. Ry. Co., 14 S.E. 432 (W. Va.
1892) (reversing jury verdict for employee after finding employer did not have knowledge or
notice of defect in equipment); McKelvey v. C. & 0. Ry. 14 S.E. 261 (W. Va. 1891) (reversing
verdict for estate of deceased employee upon finding jury instruction failed to state that employee
had to be ignorant of defective equipment). But see Syl. Pt. 4, Graham v. Newburg Orrel Coal &
Coke Co., 18 S.E. 584 (W. Va. 1893) ("Where an employee knows of defects in machinery, appliances, or his working place, and is by words, acts, or conduct of his employer lulled into a sense
of security, and continues in service, and is injured by reason of such defects, he is not precluded
thereby from recovery of damages from his employer, if the danger be not so plain and obvious
58
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It was further held in a later case that "[a] servant can not recover if his
59
injury was the direct result of his own disobedience of orders." The supreme
court also ruled that "[a]n employe[e] cannot recover from his employer for
injuries received by reason of an accident which could have been averted by the
employe[e's] proper and prudent discharge of his duties ....60
Employers in the state usually prevailed in litigation brought by injured
employees. The devastatingly overwhelming litigation success of employers
of the risk, (2) conwas primarily the result of three defenses: (1) assumption
62
tributory negligence, and (3) the fellow-servant doctrine.
a.

Assumption of the Risk

The doctrine of assumption of the risk was one of the defenses that an
employer had, in an action brought by an injured employee. The general contours of this defense were established in Cooper. In Cooper, the supreme court

held that "[t]he ordinary risks and perils incident to the employment which the
servant can foresee, or shun, or avoid, or guard against by prudence, skill and
forecast are assumed by him, and they are supposed to enter into the consideration to be received by him for his services."63 Moreover, it was said in Hoffnan
that "[i]f a servant wilfully encounters dangers which are known to him, or
64 are
notorious, the master is not responsible for any injury occasioned thereby."
that a prudent, careful man, anxious for his own safety, ought not to risk it.").
59

Syl. Pt. 6, Knight v. Cooper, 14 S.E. 999 (W. Va. 1892).

60

Syl. Pt. 6, Seldomridge v. C. & 0 Ry. Co., 33 S.E. 293 (W. Va. 1899).

61

See supra note 55.

62

"These three common law doctrines were coined the 'unholy trinity' defenses." Gurtler,

supra note 23, at 287.
63
Cooper v. Pitt., Cinn., & St. Louis R.R. Co., 24 W. Va. 37, 51 (1884). See Riley v. W. Va.
Cent. & Pac. Ry. Co., 27 W. Va. 145, 158 (1885) ("The implied contract of service is that when
the servant enters into the employment he assumes all the risks ordinarily incident to the business.
The servant is presumed to have contracted with reference to all the hazards and risks ordinarily
incident to the employment; consequently he can not recover for injuries resulting to him therefrom.") (citation omitted); Bems v. Gaston Gas Coal Co., 27 W. Va. 285, 299-300 (1885) ("When
a servant enters into the employment of a master, he assumes all the ordinary risks incident to the
employment, whether the employment is dangerous or otherwise."); Syl. Pt. 5, Knight, ("A servant
having knowledge of danger about him must use diligence and care in protecting himself from
harm."); Woodell v. W. Va. Improvement Co., 17 S.E. 386, 396 (W. Va. 1893) ("[Tlhe general
rule is well settled that if the servant continues in the employment... after the risk of such danger
comes to his knowledge, he is deemed to assume such risk, and to waive any claim upon his employer for damages in case of injury.").
Hoffman v. Dickinson, 6 S.E. 53, 58 (W. Va. 1888). See also Williamson v. Newport News
& Miss. Valley Co., 12 S.E. 824 (W. Va. 1891) (employee assumed risk that caused his death);
Core v. Ohio River R.R. Co., 18 S.E. 596 (W. Va. 1893) (assumption of risk found); Stewart v.
Ohio River R.R. Co., 20 S.E. 922 (W. Va. 1895) (reversing verdict for employee upon finding
64
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ContributoryNegligence

The essence of the doctrine of contributory negligence holds that "if the
negligence be mutual on the part of the [employee] and [employer], there can be
no recovery." ' 65 In Criswell v. Pittsburgh, Cincinnatti, and St. Louis Railway
Co. 66 the supreme court summarized the defense of contributory negligence as
follows: .' [Tihe employe[e] himself is bound to exercise all reasonable care and
prudence[,] and if an injury results through his want of care, or through his own
negligence, combined with that of his employer, he has no right of action
against the [employer]."' 67 The supreme court extended the contributory negligence defense in a later case, by holding that when an employee "does not avail
himself of the rules and regulations which the master has provided to avoid and
avert . . . dangers, the master is not responsible for an injury occasioned
68
thereby."
c.

Fellow-Servant Doctrine

While addressing the fellow-servant doctrine in Beuhring v. C. & 0.
Railway Co., 69 the supreme court stated that "[t]he master can not answer for the
negligence of all his servants hurting one another. This would be an embargo
assumption of risk); Skidmore v. W. Va. & Pitt. R.R. Co., 23 S.E. 713 (W. Va. 1895) (finding
assumption of risk); Oliver v. Ohio River R.R. Co., 26 S.E. 444 (W. Va. 1896) (reversing after
finding assumption of risk); Sanderson v. Panther Lumber Co., 40 S.E. 368 (W. Va. 1901) (reversing employee judgment upon finding assumption of risk applied); Richards v. Riverside Ironworks, 49 S.E. 437 (W. Va. 1904) (reversing verdict for estate of deceased employee after finding
assumption of risk doctrine applied).
65 Syl. Pt. 2 , Overby v. C. & 0. Ry. Co., 16 S.E. 813 (W. Va. 1893). See also Massie v. Peel
Splint Coal Co., 24 S.E. 644 (W. Va. 1896) (reversing verdict for employee upon finding contributory negligence).
66 6 S.E. 31 (W. Va. 1888).
67

Id. at 46, (quoting H.G. WooD, LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT, § 366 (1877)). See Gerity

v. Haley, 29 W. Va. 98 (1886) (finding decedent's negligent conduct in digging ditch too deep
contributed to his death therefore employer not liable); Comer v. Consol. Coal & Mining Co., 12
S.E. 476 (W. Va. 1890) (reversing employee verdict upon finding circuit court committed error in
failing to give proffered contributory negligence instruction); Johnson v. C. & 0. Ry. Co., 18 S.E.
573 (W.Va. 1893) (reversing employee verdict upon finding contributory negligence); Reese v.
Wheeling & Elm Grove R.R. Co., 26 S.E. 204 (W. Va. 1896) (reversing where contributory negligence found).
68 Syl. Pt. 1, Davis v. Nuttallsburg Coal & Coke Co., 12 S.E. 539 (W. Va. 1890). See Syl. Pt. 3
Overby , 16 S.E. at 813 ("Where an employe[e] ...

receives an injury which is caused by his

acting in direct violation of a reasonable rule made by [a] company for the safety of its servants, of
which rule he has notice, and has promised to obey, he must be deemed guilty of contributory
negligence, and can not recover damages from the company for such injury.").
69 16 S.E. 435 (W.Va. 1892).
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on business. It would destroy any employer in any calling." 70 The observation
made in Beuhring summarized the justification for the fellow-servant doctrine.

Under this doctrine "[a] master is not liable to his servant for negligence of his
fellow-servant while engaged in the same common employment ... ."71 The
fellow-servant doctrine was defined in Unfried v. B. & 0. Railroad Co.72 in the
following manner:
Any person in the employment of the same master, and under
his control, whether his position is equal, inferior, or superior to

that of the injured servant, so long as he is not intrusted with a
power of control over that servant, is a fellow servant with him.

No extent of difference in their wages, social position, or work
affects the relation of servants of the same master so long as
they are employed in one general business .... 73

In the final analysis, the three major common law employer defenses, (1) assumption of the risk, (2) contributory negligence, and (3) the fellow-servant
doctrine, nullified the legal efforts of injured workers. This situation cried out
for change. The state legislature eventually responded to the plight of injured

employees in 1913.
B.

Statutory Creation of Workers' Compensation System

Pursuant to Chapter Ten of the Acts of 1913 ("Acts"), 74 the state legislature created a workers' compensation system. 7 5 The preamble to the Acts
70

Id. at 435.

71

Criswell, 6 S.E. at 40. (citation omitted). See Cawley v. Winifrede R.R. Co., 5 S.E. 318

(W.Va. 1888) (finding negligence by co-employee relieved employer of liability for plaintiffs
injury); Young v. W.Va. Cent. & Pitt. Ry. Co., 24 S.E. 615 (W.Va. 1896) (reversing verdict for
employee upon finding fellow-servant doctrine applicable); Jackson v. Norfolk & W. R.R. Co., 27
S.E. 278 (W.Va. 1897) (reversing after finding fellow-servant doctrine applied to conductor and
brakeman); Williams v. Thacker Coal & Coke Co., 30 S.E. 107 (W.Va. 1898) (finding a mine
boss was a fellow-servant of other employees); Cochran v. Shanahan, 41 S.E. 140 (W.Va. 1902)
(affirming judgment for employer upon finding fellow-servant rule applied); Purkey v. S. Coal &
Transp. Co., 50 S.E. 755 (W.Va. 1905) (reversing verdict for employee upon finding fellowservant doctrine applied).
72

12 S.E. 512 (W.Va. 1890).

Id. at 516, (quoting THOMAS G. SHERMAN & ANMASA A. REDFIELD, LAW OF NEGLIGENCE, §
224 (6th ed. 1913) (internal quotation marks omitted)). But see Madden v. C. & 0. Ry. Co., 28
W.Va. 610, 618 ("[T]wo servants of the same master are not fellow-servants when one acts in a
superior capacity to the other in regard to some duty due from the master, and the master is liable
for any injuries to the subordinate caused by the carelessness or negligence of the superior.");
Flannegan v. C. & 0 Ry. Co., 21 S.E. 1028 (W.Va. 1895) (brakeman and telegraph operator not
fellow-servants).
73

74

1913 W. VA. ACTS ch. 10 (codified as amended at W. VA. CODE §§ 23-1-1 TO 23-6-3) (2002
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stated that its purpose was "to provide a method of compensation for employe[e]s that may be injured, or the dependents of those killed in the course of
their employment ... and to define and fix the rights of employe[e]s and employers ....,76 In an early interpretation of the Acts in Archibald v. Ott, 77 the
supreme court held that "[r]ight of compensation under the statue does not depend upon negligence or fault of the employer and is not precluded by mere
negligence on the part of the employe [sic] causing the injury. It gives compensation for
injuries received 'in the course of and resulting from' the employ78
,

ment."

The decision in Archibald succinctly stated the essence of the nature of
the workers' compensation system, i.e., it is a no-fault system of compensability

for work-related injuries.7 9 So long as an employee's injury is received in the
course of and resultingfrom his/her employment, the workers' compensation
system provides the employee with appropriate medical and monetary benefits. The remedy provided for injured employees by the state's workers' compensation statute is an exclusive remedy. Except for a few narrow exceptions,
& Supp.2004).
It will be noted that "[tihe first workers' compensation law passed in the United States was
the precursor of the Federal Employ[ees] Compensation Act of 1908, which applied to certain
federal employees engaged in hazardous work." Kilgour, supra note 8, at 85. See Keaney, supra
note 7, at 283 ("In 1908, Congress adopted a workmen's compensation law for federal employees
limited in scope of coverage and benefits ....
")New York was the first state to enact a compulsory workers' compensation statute. It did so in 1910. However, the statute was found unconstitutional by the state's highest court in Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N.Y. 271 (1911). In rendering
the decision in Ives, the court held that the statute imposed a "liability unknown to the common
law and ...constitutes a deprivation of liberty and property under the Federal and State Constitutions ...." Id. at 294. Subsequent to the decision in Ives, New York created another system, in
1914, which was ultimately found constitutional by the United States Supreme Court in N.Y.
Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). The decision in White had a snowball effect, so that
by 1949 all jurisdictions had a workers' compensation system. See DONALD T. DECARLO &
75

MARTIN MINKOWITZ, WORKERS COMPENSATION INSURANCE AND LAW
GENERATON, 1-7 (1st ed. 1989).
76

PRACTICE:

THE NEXT

1913 W. Va. Acts ch. 10. It will be noted that, as originally enacted, the state's workers'

compensation system was called "workmen's" compensation. The legislature, pursuant to the Acts
of 1983, Chapter 189, abolished the term "workmen's" and inserted the term "workers' in its
place. It will also be noted here that a narrow group of employers are not required to subscribe to
the workers' compensation system. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004).
77

87 S.E. 791 (W. Va. 1916).

Id. at 792. The supreme court also noted in Archibald that the state's workers' compensation system was "based upon the principles of the English Compensation Act .. ."Id.
79
Under the Acts an injury is defined so as to include occupational diseases. See W. VA. CODE
78

ANN. § 23-4-1 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004).
See Damron v. State Comp. Comm'r, 155 S.E. 119, 122 (W. Va. 1930) ("An injury to be

80

compensable must be received 'in the course of and resulting from' the employment.") (citations
omitted).
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discussed infra, injured employees generally may not file a common law action
against employers. 81 Additionally, employers are not permitted to raise their
against employees seeking benefits
common law "unholy trinity" defenses 82
83
under the workers' compensation statute.
81

See W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-6 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004), 23-2-6a (LexisNexis 2002) &

23-4-2(d)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). All jurisdictions have exclusivity provisions in their workers' compensation statutes. See ALA. CODE § 25-5-53 (Michie 2000); ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.055
(LexisNexis 2002); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1022 (West 1995); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 11-9105(a) (LexisNexis 2002); CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602 (Deering Supp. 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. §§
8-41-102 & 8-41-104 (LexisNexis 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-284(a) (West 2003); DEL.
CODE. ANN. tit. 19, § 2304 (Michie 1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1504 (West 2001); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 440.11(1) (West Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-11 (LexisNexis 2004); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 386-5 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 72-211 (LexisNexis 1999); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
305/11 (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-6 (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.20 (West
Supp. 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501(a) (2000); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.690 (Michie
1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032 (West 1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 104 (West
2001); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-509 (1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 24
(LexisNexis 2000) (the statute requires the employee give written notice at time of hiring that
he/she retains common law right of action); MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.131(1) (LexisNexis
2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.031 (West 1993); MiSS. CODE ANN. § 71-3-9 (1995); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 287.120(2) (West 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-411 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48101 (1998); NEV. REV. STAT. 616A.020 (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281-A:8 (West Supp.
2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-8 (West 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-9 (Michie 1995); N.Y.
WORKERS' COMP. LAW § 10 (McKinney Supp 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 (LexisNexis
2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-08 (LexisNexis 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.74 (Page
2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 12 (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 656.018 (2002); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 77, § 481 (West 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-29-17 (LexisNexis 2003); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 42-1-540 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 62-3-2 (Michie 1993); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 50-6-108(a) (LexisNexis 1999); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.001 (Vernon 1996); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 34A-2-105 (LexisNexis 2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 622 (Equity Supp. 1999); VA.
CODE ANN. § 65.2-307 (West 2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.32.010 (West 2002); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 102.03(2) (West 2004); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-104 (LexisNexis 2003).
82
That is, assumption of the risk, contributory negligence and the fellow-servant doctrine. See
Deller v. Naymick, 342 S.E.2d 73, 80 (W. Va. 1985) ("[T]he purpose of coemployee (and employer) immunity under the Workers' Compensation Act is to replace the common-law tort claims
and defenses between or among employers and employees with the no-fault, exclusive remedy of
workers' compensation.").
83

Although the exclusivity provisions of the state's workers' compensation statute implicitly
abrogates employer common law defenses in administrative proceedings, the legislature explicitly
abolished employer common law defenses in civil actions brought by injured employees against
employers who fail to provide workers' compensation coverage. See 1913 W. Va. Acts ch. 10, §
26, codified as amended, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-2-8 (LexisNexis 2002); Syl. Pt. 8, Roberts v.
Consolidation Coal Co., 539 S.E.2d 478 (W. Va. 2000) ("When an employee asserts a deliberate
intention cause of action against his/her employer, . . . the employer may not assert the employee's
contributory negligence as a defense to such action."); Syl. Pt. 2, Jenkins v. Sal Chem. Co., 280
S.E.2d 243 (W. Va. 1981) ("An employer subject to the West Virginia Workmen's Compensation
Act who does not participate in it, waives all common law defenses to a work-related personal
injury suit by an employee."); Syl. Pt. 1, Estep v. Price, 115 S.E. 861 (W. Va. 1923) ("[The employer] cannot interpose the common-law defenses of fellow servant rule, assumption of risk, or
contributory negligence as a defense.").
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Exceptions to the No-Fault System

The Acts carved out exceptions to employee coverage and employer liability under the state's workers' compensation system.
1.

Employee Exceptions

The Acts created circumstances precluding an employee from receiving
workers' compensation benefits for an injury sustained in the course of and resulting from his/her employment. In section 28, chapter 10 of the Acts of
1913, 84 the legislature set out three circumstances which would prevent an injured employee from receiving workers' compensation benefits: self-inflicted
intoxication at time of injury, 86 or willful misconduct by
injury,85 employee
87
employee.
In addition to West Virginia, all jurisdictions have by statute either explicitly or implicitly abolished common law defenses in workers' compensation litigation. See ALA. CODE § 25-5-32 (Michie 2000); ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.045 (LexisNexis 2002); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-907(A)
(West Supp. 2003); ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 11-9-105(b)(2) & 11-9-401(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2002);
CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3600 (Deering Supp. 2004) & 3708 (Deering 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 841-101 (LexisNexis 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-284 (West 2003); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit.
19, § 2314 (Michie 1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1504(b) (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
440.11(1) (Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-11 (LexisNexis 2004); HAW. REV. STAT. § 386-5
(1993); IDAHO CODE § 72-209 (LexisNexis 1999); 820 ILL. COMiP. STAT. ANN. 305/11 (West
1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-6 (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.20 (West Supp. 2004);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501(a) (2000); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 342.690 (Michie 1997); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 23:1032 (West 1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 103 (West 2001); MD.
CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 9-501 & 9-507 (1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 66 (LexisNexis 2000); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 418.141 (LexisNexis 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
176.031 (West 1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-3-9 (1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.120(1) (West
1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-509 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-102 (1998); NEV. REV.
STAT. 616A.020 (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281-A:8 (West Supp. 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
34:15-2 (West 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-8 (Michie 1995); N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW §
10 (McKinney Supp. 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 (LexisNexis 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE §
65-09-02 (LexisNexis 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.77 (Page 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 85, § 12 (West 1992); OR. RV. STAT. § 656.020 (2002); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 41 (West
2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-29-3 (LexisNexis 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-540 (Law. Co-op.
1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 62-3-3 (Michie 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-111 (LexisNexis
1999); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.001 (Vernon 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-105 (LexisNexis 2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 622 (Equity Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-307
(West 2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.32.010 (West 2002); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.03(2)
(West 2004); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-104 (LexisNexis 2003).
94
Codified as amended, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-2(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004).
85

For examples of other jurisdictions that deny benefits for a self-inflicted injury, see FLA.

STAT. ANN. § 440.09(3) (West Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN.
HAW. REV. STAT.

§ 34-9-17(a) (LexisNexis 2004);

§ 386-3(b) (Supp. 2003); IDAHO CODE § 72-208(1) (LexisNexis 1999); IND.

CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-8 (Michie 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501(d)(1) (2000); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 39-A, § 202 (West 2001); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-506(a) (Supp. 2003);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 27 (LexisNexis 2000); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.305
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Employer Exceptions

The Acts and decisions by the supreme court have created circumstances which will allow an employee to sue an employer for an injury sustained
in the course of, and resulting from his/her employment. Under the Acts an
employer is liable to an employee in a common law tort action for a deliberate
intention injury. 88 Under the Acts, an injured employee may bring a civil action
(LexisNexis 2001); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.120(3) (West 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-127
(1998); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 431 (West 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-33-2 (LexisNexis 2003);
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.032(1)(B) (Vernon 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-306(A)(1) (West
Supp. 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.32.020 (West 2002).
In 1983, the supreme court was asked to decide whether suicide by an employee, who was injured
in the course of and resulting from his employment, fell within the self-inflicted injury exception
of the Acts so as to preclude benefits to his widow. The issue was raised in Hall v. Workmen's
Compensation Commissioner, 303 S.E.2d 726 (W. Va. 1983). The supreme court resolved the
matter by carving out an exception to the Act's self-inflicted injury exception. The following was
said in Hall:
[A]n employee's suicide which arises in the course of and results from covered
employment is compensable . .. , provided, (1) the employee sustained an injury which itself arose in the course of and resulted from covered employment,
and (2) without that injury the employee would not have developed a mental
disorder of such degree as to impair the employee's normal and rational judgment, and (3) without that mental disorder the employee would not have committed suicide.
Hall, 303 S.E.2d at 730-3 1. For a brief discussion of the decision in Hall see, John R. Batt and
Christopher P. Bastien, Suicide as a Compensable Claim Under Workers' Compensation Statutes:
A Guidefor the Lawyer andthe Psychiatrist,86 W. VA. L. REV. 369, 387-92 (1983).
For examples of other jurisdictions that deny benefits for an injury sustained while intoxi86
cated or under the influence of illegal drugs, see GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-17(b) (LexisNexis 2004);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 386-3(b) (Supp. 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.16(2) (West 1996); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 44-501(d)(2) (2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1081(1)(b) (West Supp. 2004); NEV.
REV. STAT. 616C.230(l)(d) (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281-A:14 (West 1999); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 52-1-12 (Michie 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (LexisNexis 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 62-4-37 (Michie 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-110 (LexisNexis 1999); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN.
§ 406.032(l)(A) (Vernon 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-302(3)(b) (LexisNexis 2001); VA.
CODE ANN. § 65.2-306(A)(3) (West Supp. 2004).
Pursuant to subsequent amendments to the Acts the "willful misconduct" disqualifier was
87
repealed. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-2(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). Prior to the repeal of the
provision, the supreme court interpreted willful misconduct to include a violation of an employer's safety rules. See Ex parte Mitchell, 14 S.E.2d 771 (W. Va. 1941); Thompson v. State
Comp. Comm'r, 54 S.E.2d 13 (W. Va. 1949). For examples of other jurisdictions that deny or
reduce benefits for an injury sustained through willful misconduct, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-42112 (LexisNexis 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.09(5) (West Supp. 2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
342.165(1) (Michie 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-10 (Michie 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A2-302(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2001); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.58 (West 2004).
See W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 23-4-2(c) & 23-4-2(d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). See also, Rus88
sell v. Bush & Burchett, Inc., 559 S.E.2d 36 (W. Va. 2001); Erie Ins. Property and Cas. Co. v.
Stage Show Pizza, JTS, Inc., 553 S.E.2d 257 (W. Va. 2001); Nutter v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 550
S.E.2d 398 (W. Va. 2001); Roberts v. Consolidation Coal Co., 539 S.E.2d 478 (W. Va. 2000);
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89

coverage.
against an employer who failed to provide workers' compensation
An employee may also maintain a cause of action against an employer for discriminatory action taken against the employee for receiving workers' compensation benefits. Finally, in a decision by the supreme court, employees have been
given the right to bring a private cause of action against employers who frauduto prevent an employee from obtaining workers' compensation
lently attempt
91
benefits.
D.

Types of Compensation Benefits

The benefits provided to injured employees under the Acts may be divided generally into six categories: (1) temporary total disability benefits, 9 2 (2)
temporary partial rehabilitation benefits,93 (3) permanent partial disability bene96
and (6)
total disability benefits, 95 (5) death benefits,
fits, (4) permanent
97
medical benefits.
1.

Temporary Total Disability Benefits

A worker sustaining a compensable injury, temporary and total in nature, is entitled to receive monetary benefits. The workers' compensation statute provides for such compensation as follows:

Tolliver v. Kroger Co., 498 S.E.2d 702 (W. Va. 1997); Bell v. Vecellio & Grogan, Inc., 475
S.E.2d 138 (W. Va. 1996); Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978).
89
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-2-8 (LexisNexis 2002). See also, Erie Ins. Property and Cas.
Co. v. Stage Show Pizza, JTS, Inc., 553 S.E.2d 257 (W. Va. 2001); State ex tel. Frazier v. Hrko,
510 S.E.2d 486 (W. Va. 1998); Kosegi v. Pugliese, 407 S.E.2d 388 (W. Va. 1991).
90
See W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 23-5A-1 to 23-5A-3 (LexisNexis 2002). See also, Wriston v.
Raleigh County Emergency Servs. Auth., 518 S.E.2d 650 (W. Va. 1999); Rollins v. Mason
County Bd. of Educ., 489 S.E.2d 768 (W. Va. 1997); Myers v. Morgantown Health Care Corp.,
434 S.E.2d 7 (W. Va. 1993); Pannell v. Inco Alloys Int'l., Inc., 422 S.E.2d 643 (W. Va. 1992);
Powell v. Wyoming Cablevision, Inc., 403 S.E.2d 717 (W, Va. 1991).
9'
See Persinger v. Peabody Coal Co., 474 S.E.2d 887 (W. Va. 1996).
92
93

See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-6 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004).
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-9 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004).

94

See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-6 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004).
95
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-6 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004).
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-10 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). See also W. VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 23-4-4 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004), 23-4-11 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004), 23-4-12 (LexisNexis Supp.
2004), & 23-4-13 (LexisNexis 2002).
97 See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-3 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004).
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[I]f the injury causes temporary total disability, the employee
shall receive during the continuance of the disability a maximum weekly benefit to be computed on the basis of sixty-six
and two-thirds percent of the average weekly wage earnings,
wherever earned, of the injured employee, at the date of injury,
not to exceed one hundred percent of the average weekly wage

in West Virginia.... The minimum weekly benefits paid under
this subdivision shall not be less than thirty-three and one-third
98
percent of the average weekly wage in West Virginia ....

It is also provided by statute that the "aggregate award for a single injury for
which an award of temporary total disability benefits
is made ...
99
period not exceeding one hundred four weeks."

shall be for a

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-6(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). Prior to an amendment in 2003,
the maximum weekly benefit was computed on the basis of seventy percent of the average weekly
wage earnings. For a discussion of the statute prior to the amendment, see Dunlap v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 232 S.E.2d 343 (W. Va. 1977); State ex rel. Conley v. Pennybacker, 48
S.E.2d 9 (W. Va. 1948). For other jurisdictions that provide for temporary total disability benefits
see, ALA. CODE § 25-5-57(a)(1) (Michie 2000); ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.185 (LexisNexis 2002);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1045(A) (West Supp. 2003); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 11-9-519 (LexisNexis 2002); CAL. LAB. CODE § 4653 (Deering 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-42-105 (LexisNexis 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-307(a) (West 2003); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 19, § 2324
(Michie 1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1508(2) (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.15(2) (West
Supp 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-261 (LexisNexis 2004); HAW. REV. STAT.§ 386-31(b) (1993);
IDAHO CODE § 72-408 (LexisNexis 1999); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/8 (West Supp. 2004);
IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-3-8 (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.33(1) (West Supp. 2004); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 44-510c(b) (2000); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.730(l)(a) (Michie Supp. 2003); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN.§ 23:1221(1) (West Supp. 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 212 (West
2001); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-618 (1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 34
(LexisNexis 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.351(1) (LexisNexis 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 176.101(1) (West Supp. 2004); Miss. CODE ANN. § 71-3-17(b) (1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
287.170 (West Supp. 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-701 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-121(1)
(Supp. 2002); NEV. REV. STAT. 616C.475 (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281-A:28 (West
1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-12(a) (West 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 52-1-25.1 (Michie 1995);
N.Y. WORKERS' CoMP. LAW § 15(2) (McKinney Supp. 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-29 (LexisNexis 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-09 (LexisNexis 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.56
(Page 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 22(2) (West Supp. 2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 656.210
(2002); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 511 (West 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-33-17 (LexisNexis
2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-10 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 62-4-3 (Michic Supp. 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-207(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003); TEX. LAB. CODE
ANN. § 408.103 (Vernon 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-410 (LexisNexis 2001); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 642 (Equity Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-500 (West Supp. 2004); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 51.32.090 (West 2002); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.43(1) (West 2004); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 27-14-404 (LexisNexis 2003).
99
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-6(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). Prior to an amendment in 2003,
the aggregate award for temporary total disability benefits was for a period not exceeding two
hundred eight weeks.
98
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Temporary Partial Rehabilitation Benefits

Under the state's workers' compensation statute an injured worker who
returns to work may be entitled to temporary partial rehabilitation benefits. The
workers' compensation statute provides that when an injured employee "returns
to gainful employment as part of a rehabilitation plan, and the employee's average weekly wage earnings are less than the average weekly wage earnings
earned by the injured employee at the time of the injury, he or she shall receive
temporary partial rehabilitation benefits ..... 100 Under the statute temporary
partial rehabilitation benefits are intended, essentially, to compensate for any
decrease in wages incurred by a rehabilitating employee who has returned to
work.
Temporary partial rehabilitation benefits are based upon "seventy percent of the difference between the average weekly wage earnings earned at the
time of the injury and the average weekly wage earnings earned at the new employment
. ,101 The statute requires such benefits be "reviewed every ninety
days to determine whether the injured employee's average weekly wage in the
new employment has changed ... ,102
100
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-9(d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). For other jurisdictions that provide for temporary partial rehabilitation benefits, see ALA. CODE § 25-5-57(a)(2) (Michie 2000);
ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.200 (LexisNexis 2002); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1044(A) (West
1995); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 11-9-520 (LexisNexis 2002); CAL. LAB. CODE § 4654 (Deering 1991);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-42-106 (LexisNexis 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-308(a) (West
2003); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 19, § 2325 (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1508 (West 2001); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 440.15(4) (West Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-262 (LexisNexis 2004);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 386-32(b) (Supp. 2003); IDAHO CODE § 72-408 (LexisNexis 1999); 820 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/8 (West Supp. 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-3-9 (Michie 1997); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 85.33(4) (West Supp. 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-510e(a) (2000); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 342.730(1)(b) (Michie Supp. 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1221(4) (West Supp.
2004); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 213 (West Supp. 2003); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL.
§ 9-614 (1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 35 (LexisNexis 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 418.361 (LexisNexis 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.101(2) (West Supp. 2004); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 71-3-21 (1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.180 (West 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 3971-712 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-121(2) (Supp. 2002); NEV. REV. STAT. 616C.500 (2003);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 281-A:31 (West 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-12(a) (West 2000);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-42 (Michie 1995); N.Y. WORKER S' Comp. LAW § 15(5) (McKinney
Supp. 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-30 (LexisNexis 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-10 (LexisNexis 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 4123.57 (Page 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 22(4)
(West Supp. 2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 656.212 (2002); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 512 (West Supp.
2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-33-18 (LexisNexis 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-20 (Law. Co-op.
1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 62-4-5 (Michie Supp. 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-207(2)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2003); TEx. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.103 (Vernon 1996); 5 U.S.C.A. § 8106
(West 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35A-3-411 (LexisNexis 2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 646

(Equity Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-502 (West Supp. 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
51.32.055 (West 2002); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 102.43(2) (West 2004). Wyoming's statute issilent on

temporary partial rehabilitation benefits.
101 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-9(d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004).
102

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-9(d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004).
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Permanent Partial Disability Benefits

An employee who sustains a permanent partial disability is entitled to a
monetary "award [that is] computed on the basis of four weeks' compensation
for each percent of disability ....,,103 The weekly income that is used in the
formula cannot exceed a maximum of "sixty-six and two-thirds percent of [the
employee's] average weekly wage earnings ...at the time of the date of injury.
... I The minimum weekly income used for the formula is "thirty-three and
one-third percent of the average weekly wage in West Virginia. . . .",105 Disability percentages for the loss of specific body parts are set out in the workers'
compensation statute. 106 Where the loss of a body part is not involved, the de-

103 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-6(e)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). See also W. VA. CODE ANN. §
23-4-6(e)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004) (where certain circumstances permit the permanent partial
award to be based upon six weeks of compensation). For other jurisdictions that provide for permanent partial disability benefits see, ALA. CODE § 25-5-57(a)(3) (Michie 2000); ALASKA STAT.
§ 23.30.190 (LexisNexis 2002); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1044(B) (West 1995); ARK. CODE.
ANN. §§ 11-9-521 & 11-9-522 (LexisNexis 2002); CAL. LAB. CODE § 4658 (Deering Supp. 2004);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-42-107 (LexisNexis 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-308(a) (West
2003); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 2324 & 2326 (Michie 1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1508(3)
(West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.15(3) (West Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-263 (LexisNexis 2004); HAW. REV. STAT. § 386-32(a) (Supp. 2003); IDAHO CODE § 72-408 (LexisNexis
1999); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/8 (West Supp. 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-3-10 (Michie Supp. 2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.34(2) (West Supp. 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-51 Od
(2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.730(1)(b) (Michie Supp. 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
23:1221(4) (West Supp. 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 213 (West Supp. 2003); MD.
CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-625 (1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN ch. 152, § 36 (LexisNexis
2000); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.361 (LexisNexis 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.101(2)
(West Supp. 2004); Miss. CODE ANN. § 71-3-17(c) (1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.190 (West
Supp. 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-703 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-121(3) (Supp. 2002);
NEV. REV. STAT. 616C.490 (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281-A:31-a (West 1999); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 34:15-12(c) (West 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-142 (Michie 1995); N.Y. WORKERS'
COMP. LAW § 15(3) (McKinney Supp. 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-30 (LexisNexis 2003); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 65-05-12.2 (LexisNexis 2003); OInO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.57 (Page 2001);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 22(3) (West Supp. 2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 656.214 (2002); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 512 (West Supp. 2004) & 513 (West 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-33-18
(LexisNexis 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-9-20 & 42-9-30 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 2003);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 62-4-5 & 62-4-6 (Michie Supp. 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-207(3)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2003); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.126 (Vernon 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. §
34A-2-412 (LexisNexis 2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 648 (Equity Supp. 1999); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 65.2-502 (West Supp. 2004) & 65.2-503 (West 2001); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §
51.32.080 (West 2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 102.43(2), 102.44(3) & 102.52 (West 2004); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 27-14-405 (LexisNexis 2003).

104 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 234-6(d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004).
105 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-6(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004).
106 Benefits for the loss of specific body parts are set out in W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-6(0
(LexisNexis Supp. 2004).
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gree of permanent partial disability is "determined exclusively0 7by the degree of
whole body medical impairment that a [worker] has suffered."'
4.

Permanent Total Disability Benefits

A worker determined to be permanently and totally disabled is entitled
to receive a monetary award "not to exceed a maximum benefit of sixty-six and
two-thirds percent of [the employee's] average weekly earnings.., at the time
of the date of injury . . . ."10 The minimum weekly benefits paid to a permanently and totally disabled worker cannot "be less than thirty-three and one-third
As a general matpercent of the average weekly wage in West Virginia. . . .
ter, in order for a worker to be eligible to apply for permanent total disability
benefits he/she "(A) [m]ust have been awarded the sum of fifty percent in prior
permanent partial disability awards; (B) must have suffered a single occupational injury or disease which results in a finding by the commission that the

107

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-6(i) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). See also W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-

4-6b(e) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004) (setting out table for hearing disability rating).
108 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-6(d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). For other jurisdictions that provide for permanent total disability benefits, see ALA. CODE § 25-5-57(a)(4) (Michie 2000);
ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.180 (LexisNexis 2002); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1045(B) (West
1995); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 11-9-519 (LexisNexis 2002); CAL. LAB. CODE § 4659(b) (Deering
Supp. 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-42-111 (LexisNexis 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31307(a) (West 2003); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 19, § 2324 (Michie 1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 321508(1) (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.15(1) (West Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9261 (LexisNexis 2004); HAw. REV. STAT. § 386-31(a) (1993); IDAHO CODE § 72-408 (LexisNexis
1999); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/8 (West Supp. 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-3-10 (Michie Supp. 2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.34(3) (West Supp. 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-5 1Oc(a)
(2000); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.730(l)(a) (Michie Supp. 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
23:1221(2) (West Supp. 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 212 (West 2001); MD. CODE
ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-635 (1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN ch. 152, § 34A (LexisNexis 2000);
MICH. COMp.LAWS ANN. § 418.351(2) (LexisNexis 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.101(4) (West
Supp. 2004); Miss. CODE ANN. § 71-3-17(a) (1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.200 (West Supp.
2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-702 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-121(3) (Supp. 2002); NEV.
REV. STAT. 616C.440 (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281-A:28-a (West 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 34:15-12(b) (West 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-41 (Michie Supp. 2002); N.Y. WORKERS'
COMp. LAW § 15(1) (McKinney Supp. 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-29 (LexisNexis 2003); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 65-05-09 (LexisNexis 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.58 (Page 2001); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 22(1) (West Supp. 2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 656.206 (2002); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 77, §§ 511 & 513 (West 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-33-17 & 28-33-19 (LexisNexis 2003);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-9-10 & 42-9-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 62-4-6
& 62-4-7 (Michie Supp. 2003 & Michie 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-207(4) (LexisNexis
Supp. 2003); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.161 (Vernon 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-413
(LexisNexis 2001); VT, STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 644 (Equity 1987); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.2-500
(West Supp. 2004) & 65.2-503 (West 2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.32.060 (West 2002);
WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 102.43(1) & 102.44(2) (West 2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-406 (LexisNexis 2003).
109
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-6(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004).
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has sustained
[worker] has suffered a medical-impairment of fifty percent; or (C)
110
a thirty-five percent statutory disability [for loss of body parts]."'
5.

Death Benefits

The state workers' compensation statute provides that "[i]n case a per-

sonal injury.., suffered by an employee in the course of and resulting from his
or her employment, causes death," ifbenefits are to "be paid to such one or
more dependents of the decedent ... ,,112 A widow or widower who "abandons" the deceased employee, before the death causing injury occurred, is
110 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-6(n)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). The percentage impairment
eligibility requirement is qualified by W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-6(m) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004),
which provides:
(m) The following permanent disabilities shall be conclusively presumed to be
total in character:
Loss of both eyes or the sight thereof.
Loss of both hands or the use thereof
Loss of both feet or the use thereof.
Loss of one hand and one foot or the use thereof.
"'
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-10 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). For other jurisdictions that provide
for death benefits, see ALA. CODE § 25-5-57(a)(5) (Michie 2000); ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.215
(LexisNexis 2002); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1046 (West 1995); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 11-9-527
(LexisNexis 2002); CAL.LAB. CODE § 4702 (Deering Supp. 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-42-114
(LexisNexis 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-306 (West 2003); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 19, §
2330 (Michie 1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1509 (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.16 (West
Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-265 (LexisNexis 2004); HAW. REV. STAT. § 386-34 (1993);
IDAHO CODE § 72-413 (LexisNexis 1999); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/7 (West Supp. 2004);
IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-3-17 (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.31 (West Supp. 2004); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 44-510b (Supp. 2003); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 342.750 (Michie Supp. 2003); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:1231 (West Supp. 2004); ME.REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 215 (West
2001); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-678 (1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN ch. 152, § 31
(LexisNexis 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.321 (LexisNexis 2001); MrNN. STAT. ANN. §
176.101(3r) (West Supp. 2004); Miss. CODE ANN. § 71-3-25 (1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.240
(West 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-721 (2003); NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-122 (1998); NEV.
REv. STAT. 616C.505 (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281-A:26 (West 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
34:15-13 (West Supp. 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-46 (Michie Supp. 2002); N.Y. WORKERS'
COMp. LAW § 16 (McKinney Supp. 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-38 (LexisNexis 2003); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 65-05-17 (LexisNexis 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.59 (Page 2001); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 22(8) (West Supp. 2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 656.204 (2002); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 77, § 561 (West 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-33-12 (LexisNexis 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 429-290 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 62-4-12 (Michie Supp. 2003); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 50-6-207(5) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003); TEx. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.181 (Vernon
1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-414 (LexisNexis 2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 632 (Equity
Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-512 (West Supp. 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.32.050
(West 2002); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.46 (West 2004); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-403(c)(iv) (LexisNexis 2003).
112
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-11 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). The amount of death benefits paid

and dependents who receive the same are provided in W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-10 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2004).
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barred from receiving death benefits. 113 However, a widow or widower may
receive death benefits if he/she "was abandoned within a period of two years by
the employee for any reason except a reason that would have entitled the de.... ,,14
ceased employee to an annulment or a divorce
6.

Medical Benefits

In addition to the benefits previously described, the workers' compensation system also provides separate medical benefits for workers injured in the
course of and resulting from employment. 115 Medical benefits include payment
"for health care services, rehabilitation services, durable medical and other
goods and other supplies and medically related items as may be reasonably required."116

113

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-13 (LexisNexis 2002). See Coletrane v. Ott, 103 S.E. 102 (W.

Va. 1920), overruled by, Foster v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd., 189 S.E. 703 (W. Va. 1937).
114

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-13 (LexisNexis 2002).

15

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-3 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). For other jurisdictions that provide

for medical benefits, see ALA. CODE § 25-5-77 (Michie 2000); ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.095(a)
(LexisNexis 2002); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-1062 & 23-1070 (West 1995); ARK. CODE.
ANN. § 11-9-508 (LexisNexis Supp. 2003); CAL. LAB. CODE § 3209.7 (Deering 1991); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 8-42-101(1) (LexisNexis 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-294d (West 2003);
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 19, § 2322 (Michie Supp. 2002); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1507 (West 2001);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.13(2) (West Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-200 (LexisNexis 2004);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 386-21 (Supp. 2003); IDAHO CODE § 72-432 (LexisNexis 1999); 820 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/8(a) (West Supp. 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-3-4 (Michie Supp. 2004);
IOWA CODE ANN.§ 85.27 (West Supp. 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-510(h) (Supp. 2003); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.020(1) (Michie Supp. 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1203(A) (West
Supp. 2004); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 206 (West Supp. 2003); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. &
EMPL. § 9-660 (1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN ch. 152, § 30 (LexisNexis 2000); MICH. COM.
LAWS ANN. § 418.315(1) (LexisNexis 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.135 (West Supp. 2004);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-3-15(1) (1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.140 (West Supp. 2004); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 39-71-704 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-120 (Supp. 2002); NEV. REV. STAT.
616C.135 (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281-A:23 (West Supp. 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
34:15-15 (West 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-49 (Michie 1995); N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW §
13(a) (McKinney Supp. 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-25 (LexisNexis 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE §
65-05-07 (LexisNexis 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.66 (Page Supp. 2003); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 85, § 14 (West Supp. 2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 656.245 (2002); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §
531 (West 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-33-5 (LexisNexis 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-15-60
(Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 62-5-21 (Michie Supp. 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. §
50-6-204 (LexisNexis Supp 2003); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.021 (Vernon 1996); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 34A-2-418 (LexisNexis 2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 640 (Equity Supp. 1999); VA.
CODE ANN. § 65.2-603 (West Supp. 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.36.010 (West 2002);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.42(1) (West 2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-401(a) (LexisNexis 2003).
116

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-3(a)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004).
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IV. WORKERS' COMPENSATION LITIGATION SCHEME

One of the initiating themes under girding the creation of workers'
compensation generally was the idea of putting an end to litigation between injured employees and their employers.
Workers' compensation was intended
to be a nonadversarial disbursement of benefits to injured employees. The Acts
of 1913 echoed this point, insofar as it provided that the Public Service Commission rendered decisions on employee benefit claims, 118 and only the supreme
court had authority to review a denial of such claims. 119 The Acts envisioned de
minimis disputes arising from administrative decisions on employee claims for
workers' compensation benefits. However, time quickly proved the Acts to be
wrong. Workers' compensation has exploded into a costly and unwieldy adversarial litigation nightmare.
The tentacled adversarial posture employees and employers brought to
workers' compensation necessitated legislative action that has resulted in the
creation of a full-blown litigation scheme. This part of the article summarizes
the litigation scheme employees and employers forced upon the workers' com..
120
pensation system.
A.

Workers' Compensation Commission

In West Virginia the workers' compensation litigation scheme is triggered at the administrative level 12 when an employee files a claim for benefits
117

See supra note 2 and text in main body.

118

See 1913 W. Va. Acts ch. 10, § 43 ("The commission shall have full power and authority to

hear and determine all questions within its jurisdiction, and its decisions thereon shall befinal.")
(emphasis added). The workers' compensation system was removed from the Public Service
Commission pursuant to the Acts of 1915, Chapter 9.
119

See 1913 W. Va. Acts ch. 10, § 43 ("[I]n case the final action of said commission denies the
right of the claimant to participate at all in such fund... then the claimant may... apply for an
appeal to the supreme court of appeals.").
120 The discussion in this part does not address the few circumstances that permit an employer
to bring an appeal in circuit court. See W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-17 & 23-4-3c(b) (LexisNexis
Supp. 2004).
121 The state of Alabama is the only jurisdiction that does not provide for an initial administrative determination of a worker's claim for benefits. In that jurisdiction if an employee and employer cannot agree on the employee's claim for benefits, the matter proceeds to a trial court of
general jurisdiction. See ALA. CODE §§ 25-5-81(a)(1) & 25-5-88 (Michie 2000). A trial is held
before the judge, but a jury is permitted under narrow circumstances. See ALA. CODE § 25-581 (a)(2) (Michie 2000).
A minority of jurisdictions utilize trial courts of general jurisdiction and juries, but only after
administrative forums have been exhausted. See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 9-737 (Supp.
2004) & 9-745(d) (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4123.51.2(A) & 4123.51.2(D) (Page 2001);
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 410.302 & 410.304 (Vernon 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 670 (Equity 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 51.52.110 & 51.52.115 (West 2002).
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with the Workers' Compensation Commission (hereinafter the "Commission"). 122 The Commission, through its Executive Director, 123 has exclusive
4
for benefits. 2
jurisdiction to render an initial decision on an employee's claim
A minority of jurisdictions utilize trial courts of general jurisdiction, but not juries, after the parties exhaust administrative proceedings. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-946 (West 1995); DEL.
CODE. ANN. tit. 19, § 2350 (Michie 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-105(b) (LexisNexis 2004); 820
ILL. COMPs. STAT. ANN. 305/19(f)(1) (West 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 86.26 (West 1996); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 71-3-51 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT 616C.370 (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-66
(West 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-10-01 (LexisNexis 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-17-60 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 62-7-19 (Michie 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6225(b) (LexisNexis Supp 2003); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.23 (West 2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2714-612 (LexisNexis 2003).
122
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-15 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004), Prior to 2003 the Commission
was called Workers' Compensation Division. In 2003 the legislature changed the name. See W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 23-1-1(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). Also in 2003 the legislature removed the
Commission from the Bureau of Employment Programs and made it an independent agency. See
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-1-1(d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004).
123
Prior to 2003 the head of the Commission was the Commissioner of the Bureau of Employment Programs. However, in 2003 the office of Executive Director was created. See W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 23-1-1b (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). The Executive Director must also work, with
respect to policy matters, in conjunction with the Workers' Compensation Board of Managers,
which in 2003 replaced the Compensation Programs Peformance Council. See W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 23-1-la (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). It will be noted that the majority of workers' compensation systems are headed by a single chief administrative officer. See ALA. CODE § 25-5-2 (Michie
2000) (director); CAL. LAB. CODE § 3206 (Deering Supp. 2004) (director); COLO. REV. STAT. § 847-101 (LexisNexis 2003) (director); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1502 (West 2001) (Mayor--however,
authority was delegated by Mayor's Order No. 82-126, 29 DCR 2843 (1982)); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
20.171 (West 2002) (secretary); HAW. REV. STAT. § 386-71 (1993) (director); IOWA CODE ANN. §
86.8 (West Supp. 2004) (commissioner); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-573 (2000) (director); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 342.228 (Michie 1997) (commissioner); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1291 (West
Supp. 2004) (director); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN ch. 152, § 5 (LexisNexis 2000) (commissioner);
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 418.205 (LexisNexis 2001) (director); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 175.105
(West 1993) (commissioner); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 286.120 (West Supp. 2004) (director); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 39-1-101 (2003) (commissioner); NEV. REV. STAT. 616A.400 (2003) (administrator); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281-A:58 (West 1999) (commissioner); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-49
(West 2000) (director); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-5-2 (Michie 1995) (director); N.D. CENT. CODE §
65-02-01 (LexisNexis 2003) (director); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.12.1 (Page Supp. 2003)
(administrator); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 3.7 (West Supp. 2004) (administrator); OR. REV.
STAT. § 656.726(3) (2002) (director); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 568 (West 2002) (secretary); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 28-29-26(a) (LexisNexis 2003) (director); S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3-80 (Law. Co-op.
1985) (director); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-37-2 (Michie 1993) (secretary); TENN. CODE ANN. §
50-6-233 (LexisNexis 1999) (commissioner); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 402.041 (Vernon 1996)
(director); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-1-204 (LexisNexis 2001) (director); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
601(20) (Equity 1987) (commissioner); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.04.020 (West 2002) (director); Wts. STAT. ANN. §§ 102.01(am), 102.01(em) (West 2004) (commission); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 27-14-802 (LexisNexis 2003) (director).
A minority of jurisdictions utilize boards or commissions to administer their workers' compensation systems. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.005 (LexisNexis 2002) (board); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 23-921 (West 1995) (commission); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 11-9-201 (LexisNexis 2002) (commission); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-276 (West 2003) (commission); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 19, §
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In its review of benefit claims by workers, the Commission is empowered to hold proceedings and "to administer oaths, certify official acts, take
depositions, issue subpoenas and compel the attendance of witnesses and the
production of pertinent books, accounts, papers, records, documents and testimony." 1 25 At proceedings before the Commission, employees and employers are
permitted to be represented by attorneys, qualified representatives, or they may
proceed pro se. Moreover, both parties are permitted to file such "information
in support of their respective positions as they consider proper.' ' 1 7 The Com128
mission is required to render its decision on a claim in writing.
B.

Office of Judges

If an employee or employer is not satisfied by the written decision of
the Commission on any claim matter, either party may "object" and appeal the
decision to the Workers' Compensation Office of Judges (hereinafter the
"OOJ"). 129 The OOJ is composed of a chief administrative law judge and a staff
2301A (Michie Supp. 2002) (board); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-40 (LexisNexis 2004) (board);
IDAHO CODE § 72-501 (LexisNexis 1999) (commission); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/13
(West Supp. 2004) (commission); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-1-2 (Michie 1997) (board); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 152 (West Supp. 2003) (board); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-302
(1999) (commission); MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-3-85 (1995) (commission); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48152 (1998) (compensation court); N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW § 142 (McKinney Supp. 2004)
(board); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-77 (LexisNexis 2003) (commission); VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-201
(West Supp. 2004) (commission).
124
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-5-1(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004); Ferguson v. State Workmen's
Comp. Comm'r, 163 S.E.2d 465 (W. Va. 1968) (holding that no one except the Executive Director
is authorized to make an initial compensation award). It will be noted that in a claim for occupational pneumoconiosis, medical questions are determined by the Occupational Pneumoconiosis
Board (OP Board), pursuant to W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 23-4-8a to 23-4-8c (LexisNexis Supp.
2004). However, the OP Board's decision on medical questions is not conclusive on whether an
employee will receive benefits for an occupational pneumoconiosis claim. See Hamrick v. State
Workmen's Comp. Conim'r, 228 S.E.2d 702 (W. Va. 1976) (where it was held that the findings
and conclusions of the OP Board merely constitute evidence for consideration by the Executive
Director).
125
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-1-8 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). Although the Commission is authorized to actually hold hearings, in practice this does not occur. As a general matter evidence is
gathered by the Commission and cases are decided on the record produced.
126

See W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-13(b) & 23-1-13(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). It will be

noted that two jurisdictions actually appoint free legal counsel for workers. See NEV. REv. STAT.
616A.435 to 616A.455 (2003); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-14-602 & 27-14-615 (LexisNexis 2003).
One jurisdiction provides free legal counsel to workers at voluntary mediation-like proceedings.
See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 11-9-703 (LexisNexis Supp. 2003).
127

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-5-1(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004).

128

See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-5-1(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004).

129

See W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 23-5-1 to 23-5-6 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). The OOJ was created

by the Acts of 1990, 2nd Ex. Sess., Chapter 12.
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of administrative law judges who are authorized to preside over objections 130 to
Commission decisions. 131
The proceedings conducted before the OOJ are de novo. 132 Pursuant to
its statutory authority the OOJ is empowered to "establish a procedure for the
hearing of disputed claims, take oaths, examine witnesses, issue subpoenas ....
and make reports that are necessary for disputed claims .... 133 The OOJ can
affirm, reverse or modify the Commission's action. 134 The decision of the OOJ
findings of fact and conclusions of law and...
must be in writing and "contain
1 35
be mailed to all parties."
C.

Workers' Compensation Boardof Review

The decision rendered by the OOJ may be appealed to the Workers'
Compensation Board of Review (hereinafter the "Board of Review"),' 36 by an
130

The administrative law judges hear cases and rule upon the same as individual judges, not

as a collective body.
131 See W. VA. CODE ANN.

§§

23-5-8 & 23-5-9 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). Administrative law

judges are utilized in the workers' compensation systems of a majority ofjurisdictions. See ARiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-941 (West 1995); ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 11-9-704(b) & 11-9-705 (LexisNexis 2002); CAL. LAB. CODE § 5310 (Deering 1991); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 8-43-201 & 8-43207 (LexisNexis 2003); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1520 (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.192
(West Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 34-9-47(c) & 34-9-102 (LexisNexis 2004); 820 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 305/19(a) (West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-551 (Supp. 2003); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN . § 342.275 (Michie Supp. 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1310.5(A) (West Supp. 2004);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 318 (West 2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN ch. 152, § 10A (LexisNexis 2000); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 418.841 & 418.847 (LexisNexis 2001); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 176.341 (West Supp. 2004); Miss. CODE ANN. § 71-3-93 (1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
287.460 (West Supp. 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-2905 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-173
(1998); NEV. REV. STAT 616C.330 (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-53 (West 2000); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 52-5-7 (Michie Supp. 2002); N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW § 150 (McKinney 1992); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4121.34, 4121.35 & 4123.51.1 (Page 2001); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 3.4
(West Supp. 2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 656.289 (2002); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 802 (West 2002);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-30-1(LexisNexis 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 62-7-12.1 (Michie 1993);
TEx. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.152 (Vernon 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-801 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2004); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(2) (West 2004); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-602 (LexisNexis 2003).
132
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-5-9(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004).
133

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-5-8(f) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004).

134

See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-5-9(d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004).

135

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-5-9(d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004).

136

The present Board of Review was established in 2003. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-5-11 (b)

(LexisNexis Supp. 2004). Prior to the creation of the Board of Review, the workers' compensation
system utilized an Appeal Board that was established by the Acts of 1935, Chapter 78. Further,
pursuant to Section 57, Chapter 68, of the Acts of 1925, the legislature had created a commission
that was referred to as the "Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board." This commission was
composed of the governor, the commissioner of labor, and the commissioner of health. The com-
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employee, employer or the Commission.13 7 The Board of Review consists of
three members who are appointed by the governor. 138 The proceeding before the
Board of Review is139based upon the record that was developed at the OOJ level
and is not de novo.
The Board of Review "may affirm, reverse, modify or supplement the
decision of the administrative law judge and make such disposition of the case
as it determines to be appropriate." 140 Board of Review decisions must "be
made by a majority vote .. ,,.141 Further, "[a]ll decisions, findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the board of review [must] be in writing and state with
upon to sustain, reverse or modify the adspecificity the laws and facts relied
' 142
ministrative law judge's decision."

mission was empowered to hear appeals from decisions by the workers' compensation commissioner. "Appeals from the decision of the commission [were taken to] the supreme court of appeals." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 56 (1925). The commission was abolished by the Acts of 1929. For a
case discussing the commission see Gore v. Hudson, 137 S.E. 229 (W. Va. 1927).
137
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-5-12(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). For other jurisdictions having administrative appeal boards see, ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.110 (LexisNexis 2002); CAL. LAB.
CODE § 5301 (Deering 1991); COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-43-301(6) (LexisNexis 2003); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 31-280b & 31-301 (West 2003); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 19, § 2348 (Miehie Supp.
2002); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 34-9-47(b) & 34-9-103 (LexisNexis 2004); HAW. REV. STAT. § 38687 (1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-555c (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.285 (Michie 1997);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN ch. 152, § lIc (LexisNexis 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.859a
(LexisNexis 2001); MrNN. STAT. ANN. § 176.421 (West Supp. 2004); NEV. REv. STAT 616C.345
(2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281-A:43,1(b) (West 1999); OKLA STAT. ANN. TIT. 85, § 3.6(A)
(West Supp. 2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 656.298 (2002); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 853 (West Supp.
2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-35-28 (LexisNexis 2003); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.202 (Vernon
Supp. 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-801 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
51.52.050 (West 2002); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(3) (West 2004).
138
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-5-1 l(d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004).
139

See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-5-12(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). Prior to the creation of the

OOJ, proceedings before the former Appeal Board were de novo. See Dillon v. State Workmen's
Comp. Comm'r, 39 S.E.2d 837 (W. Va. 1946).
140
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-5-12(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). The standard of review by the
Board of Review is also provided in W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-5-12(b). See Conley v. Workers'
Comp. Div., 483 S.E.2d 542, 549 (W. Va. 1997) ([W]hen the Appeal Board reviews a ruling from
the OOJ it must do so under the standard of review set out in W.Va. Code § 23-5-12(b), and that
failure to do so will be reversible error.").
141
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-5-12(c)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004).
142

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-5-12(c)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). See Conley v. Workers'

Comp. Div., 483 S.E.2d 542, 549 (W. Va. 1997) ("[W]hen the Appeal Board issues an order that
is not an affirmance of a ruling by the OOJ, it must set out adequate findings that support its decision.").
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Supreme Court

The final arbiter of workers' compensation disputes is the state supreme
court.14 3 It is provided by statute that "[rieview of any final decision of the
board ... may be prosecuted by either party or by the workers' compensation
commission to the supreme court of appeals within thirty days from the date of
.... "
the final order by filing a petition
Review of a decision by the Board of Review is discretionary with the
supreme court. Should an application for review of a Board of Review decision
be accepted, the supreme court "'will not reverse a finding of fact made by the.
. Board unless it appears from the proof upon which the.., board acted that
the finding is plainly wrong." ' 145 The supreme court has indicated that the
"clearly wrong" standard of review is a deferential one, "which presumes an
143

All states permit their judicial appellate courts to review workers' compensation decisions

rendered by lower tribunals. See ALA. CODE § 25-5-81(e) (Michie 2000); ALASKA STAT. §
23.30.125(c) (LexisNexis 2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-948 & 23-951 (West 1995); ARK.
CODE. ANN. § 11-9-711(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003); CAL. LAB. CODE § 5950 (Deering 1991);
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-43-307 & 8-43-313 (LexisNexis 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31301b (West 2003); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 19, § 2350(0 (Michie 1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 321522(b)(3) (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.25(5) (West Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 349-105(e) (LexisNexis 2004); HAW. REV. STAT. § 386-88 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 72-724 (LexisNexis 1999); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/19(0(2) (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-4-8
(Michie 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 86.26 (West Supp. 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-556 (Supp.
2003); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.290 (Michie 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1310.5(B)
(West Supp. 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 322 (West 2001); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. &
EMPL. § 9-750 (1999); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN ch. 152, § 12 (LexisNexis 2000); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 418.861a(14) (LexisNexis 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.471 (West 1993); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 71-3-51 (1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.495 (West Supp. 2004); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 39-71-2904 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-185 (Supp. 2002); NEV. REV. STAT 616C.370 (2003);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281-A:43,1(c) (West 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-66 (West 2000);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-5-8 (Michie 1995); N.Y. WORKERS' CoMp. LAW § 23 (McKinney Supp.
2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-86 (LexisNexis 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-10-01 (LexisNexis
2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.5 1.1(J)(4) (Page 2001); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 3.6(C)
(West Supp. 2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 656.298 (2002); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 871 (West 2002);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-35-29 (LexisNexis 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-17-60 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 62-7-17 (Michie 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-225(e)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.251 (Vernon 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2801(8) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 672 (Equity 1987); VA. CODE ANN. §
65.2-706 (West Supp. 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.52.140 (West 2002); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.25 (West 2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-612 (LexisNexis 2003).
It will be noted that Congress has barred federal judicial review of administrative decisions under
the Federal Employees' Compensation Act. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 8128(b) (West 1996). But see Benton v. United States, 960 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that judicial review of constitutional
issues not barred).
144
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-5-15(a) (Michie Supp. 2004). The statutory provision also permits
the Board of Review to certify a question of law to the supreme court.
145
Dodson v. Workers' Comp. Div., 558 S.E.2d 635, 640 (W. Va. 2001) (quoting Hosey v.

Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 151 S.E.2d 729 (W. Va. 1966)).
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administrative tribunal's actions are valid as long as the decision is supported by
substantial evidence." 146 On the other hand, "[w]here the issue on an appeal is
clearly a question of law or involving an' 147
interpretation of a statute, [the court
will] apply a de novo standard of review."

V. WORKERS' COMPENSATION REFORM MEASURES OF THE

1990's

The workers' compensation fiscal reform measures carved out by the
state legislature during the 1990's, targeted three of the primary participants in
the system: employees, employers and health care providers. This part of the
article will touch upon the salient features of some of the reform measures implemented in the 1990's that were designed 14
to8 curtail abuse of the workers'

compensation system by the latter participants.
A.

Employee Reform Measures

1.

Wrongfully Seeking Benefits
49

In 1999 the legislature enacted West Virginia Code section 61-3-24f'
to curtail the fraudulent receipt of workers' compensation benefits.150 This stat-

ute provides criminal penalties for anyone who "knowingly and with fraudulent
intent secure or attempt to secure compensation from the workers' compensation

fund or from a self-insured employer." 15' Under this statute, if the amount involved is one thousand dollars or more, the offense is a felony punishable by up
to ten years in prison. 152 The statute provides for a misdemeanor if the amount
involved is less than one thousand dollars, and permits punishment of up to one
year in jail.' 53 Additionally, a person can be sentenced up to three years con-

finement, if he/she "knowingly and willfully make[s] a false report or statement
146

See In re Queen, 473 S.E.2d 483 (W. Va. 1996); (quoting Frymier-Halloran v. Paige, 458

S.E.2d 780, 788 (W.Va. 1995).
147
Conley v. Workers' Comp. Div., 483 S.E.2d 542, 545 (W. Va. 1997). In 2003 the legislature
enacted specific standards of review to be applied to decisions of the Board of Review by the
supreme court. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-5-15 (Michie Supp. 2004).
148

Any amendments made in 2003 to the statutes that are discussed will be pointed out in

footnotes.
149
150

The statute was amended in 2003. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3-24f(Michie Supp. 2004).
The provisions of the statute were actually created in 1994, and codified at W. VA. CODE

ANN. § 23-4-19 (1994). However, the legislature repealed W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-19 in 1999,
and reenacted the provisions of the statute in W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3-24f(Michie 2000).
151 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3-24f(l) (Michie 2000).
152

See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3-24(f)(1)(C) (Michie 2000).

153

See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3-24(f)(1)(C) (Michie 2000).
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under oath, affidavit, certification or by any other means respecting any infor154
mation required to be provided under [the workers' compensation statutes]."'
Finally, the statute provides that "[i]f the person so convicted is receiving compensation from such fund or employer, he or she, from and after such conviction, cease to receive such compensation ....,155
2.

Creation of Threshold for PTD

In 1995 the legislature sought to preclude disbursement of permanent
total disability (PTD) benefits for employees with minor injuries. To do this, the
legislature amended West Virginia Code section 23-4-6 6 and added the following provision:
[I]n order to be eligible to apply for an award of permanent total
disability benefits for all injuries incurred and all diseases.., a
claimant must have been awarded the sum of fifty percent in
prior permanent partial disability awards or have suffered an
occupational injury or disease which results in a finding that5 the
7
claimant has suffered a medical impairment of fifty percent.1
Under the amendment to the statute, an injured employee generally must have
received a prior permanent partial disability award of fifty-percent or more. The
statute was challenged as violative of equal protection, but the supreme court
upheld the amendment in Blankenship v. Richardson.158 In doing so, however,
Blankenship prohibited the statute from being effective from the date of passage.
Subsequent to the decision in Blankenship, the supreme court further restricted the retro-application of the amendment to West Virginia Code section
23-4-6 in State ex rel. ACF Industries, Inc. v. Vieweg. 159 It was held in ACF that
when an employee, who has been injured in the course of and as
a result of his/her employment, applies for workers' compensation benefits in the form of a permanent total disability award
(PTD), the employee's application for such compensation is
governed by the statutory, regulatory, and common law as it ex154 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3-24(0(1)(2) (Michie 2000).
155

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3-24(0(4) (Michie 2000).

156

The statute was amended in 2003. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-6 (Michie Supp. 2004).

157 1995 W.Va. Acts ch. 253, § 23-4-6(n)(1).
158 474 S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1996).
159 514 S.E.2d 176 (W. Va. 1999).
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isted on the date of the employee's injury or last exposure when
there is no definite expression of legislative intent defining the
law by which the employee's application should be gov60
erned."1
As a result of the ACF decision, the statutory fifty-percent threshold for PTD
consideration was only applicable for injuries initially sustained after the enactment of the amendment to West Virginia Code section 23-4-6.
3.

Limitation on Reopening Claim

In an effort to prevent closed and evidentiary stale claims from being
litigated, the legislature, in 1993, enacted West Virginia Code section 23-422.161 This statute reads in part as follows:
[Any claim which was closed for the receipt of temporary total
disability benefits or which was closed on a no-lost-time basis
and which closure was more than five years prior to the effective date of this section shall not be considered to still be open
or the subject for an evaluation of the claimant for permanent
disability merely because such evaluation has not previously
been conducted and a decision on permanent disability has not

been made ....

162

In Hardy v. Richardson163 the supreme court restricted the reach of West Virginia Code section 23-4-22. Hardy held that the statute "is applicable only to
cases described in the section for which an order closing the case has been made
t 64
by the Workers' Compensation Commissioner."
4.

Allowing Subrogation When a Claimant Sues a Third Party

In some instances when an employee sustains a compensable injury by a
third party while working, the employee will file a law suit against the third
party. If the employee recovers a monetary sum from a third party, the employee will have obtained a double recovery. That is, in addition to benefits received from the workers' compensation system, the employee may also pocket a
160 Id. at 190.
161 The statute was amended in 2003. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-22 (Michie Supp. 2004).
162

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-22 (Michie Supp. 2004).

163

479 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1996).

164

Id. at 311. The decision in Hardy permitted a claimant to have his case reopened, though the

statute barred reopening, because an order had not been entered officially closing the case.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol107/iss1/6

36

Davis and Palmer: Workers' Compensation Litigation in West Virginia: Assessing the
WORKERS' COMPENSATION LITIGATION IN WEST VIRGINIA

2004]

large sum from the third party. The legislature responded to this double recovery

scenario in 1990, by enacting West Virginia Code section 23-2A-1 165 Under
this statute if an injured employee "makes a claim against said third party and
recovers any sum thereby, the Commission or a self-insured employer shall be

allowed statutory subrogation with regard to medical benefits paid. .. ,,166 In
167
the supreme court upheld the validity of the subrogation
Bush v. ••Richardson
168
provision.
5.

Limitation on State Benefits for Claimant Receiving Federal

Benefits
23-4-23 169
In 1993 the legislature enacted West Virginia Code section

for the purpose of limiting a claimant's ability to receive workers' compensation
benefits and federal old age insurance benefits. One provision in the statute,
West Virginia Code section 23-4-23(b), reduced the amount of permanent total

disability benefits a claimant received to that of fifty percent of federal benefits
received. However, in Boan v. Richardson170 the supreme court ruled the provision violated equal protection principles and was therefore unconstitutional.
Also in 1993, the legislature enacted West Virginia Code section 23-4-

24.' T' This statute prevents claimants from applying for permanent total disability benefits if they are receiving federal old age retirement benefits. 172 Under
this statute "[a]ny claimant shall be evaluated only for the purposes of receiving
a permanent partial disability award.... 173
6.

Barring Mental-Mental Claims

174
the suIn the case of Breeden v. Workmen's Compensation Comm 'r,

preme court created a workers' compensation compensable injury called a
165

The statute was amended in 2003. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-2A-1 (Michie Supp. 2004).

166

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-2A-1(b) (Michie Supp. 2004). The statute restricts the amount of

subrogation to not more than fifty percent of the amount recovered.
167
484 S.E.2d 490 (W. Va. 1997).
168

See Cart v. General Elec. Co., 506 S.E.2d 96 (W. Va. 1998) (allowing subrogation by em-

ployer); Henry v. Benyo, 506 S.E.2d 615 (W. Va. 1998) (holding that Commissioner was entitled
to a portion of employee's recovery of underinsured motorist benefits under employer's policy).
The statute was amended in 2003. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-23 (Michie Supp. 2004).
169
170

482 S.E.2d 162 (W.Va. 1996).

171 The statute was amended in 2003. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-24 (Michie Supp. 2004).
172

The supreme court has not been called upon to examine this statute.

173

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-24(a) (Michie 2002).

174 285 S.E.2d 398 (W. Va. 1981).
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"mental-mental" claim. In Breeden, the employee filed a workers' compensation

claim for a mental disability which she suffered after being subjected to harassment from her immediate supervisor. The Commission determined the claim
was not compensable. In its reversal of the Commission's decision, the supreme
court held in Breeden that "an employee who sustains mental or emotional in-

jury which occurs as a result of continuous and intentional harassment and humiliation from her supervisor extending over a period of time has175suffered a
personal injury as required by [the workers' compensation statute]."
It was not until 1993 that the legislature responded to the decision in
Breeden by enacting West Virginia Code section 23-4-if. This statute overturned Breeden and stated explicitly "that so-called mental-mental claims are
not compensable .... 176
B.

Employer Reform Measures

1.

Failing to Subscribe or Pay Premiums

In 1999 the legislature enacted West Virginia Code section 61-3-24e

177

to curtail the practice of some employers to fail to subscribe to the workers'
compensation system, or fail to pay premiums. 178 The legislature responded to

this conduct by making it a felony offense for any employer to willfully and
knowingly fail to subscribe to the system 179 or fail to pay premiums.
The
181
..."
owners
its
and
business
the
both
for
penalties
"criminal
provides
statute

175

Id. at 399.

176 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-If (Michie 2002). See Conley v. Workers' Comp. Div., 483
S.E.2d 542 (W. Va. 1997) (holding that the statute was not retroactively applicable to workers'
compensation mental-mental claims that were filed prior to the effective date of the statute); Marlin v. Bill Rich Const., Inc., 482 S.E.2d 620 (W. Va. 1996) (declining to find that fear of contracting an occupational disease or occupational pneumoconiosis was a compensable injury).
177 The statute was amended in 2003. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3-24e (Michie Supp. 2004).
178

The felony provisions of the statute were actually created in 1995, and codified at W. VA.

CODE ANN. § 23-1-16 (Michie 1998). However, the legislature repealed W. VA. CODE ANN. § 231-16 in 1999, and reenacted the provisions of the statute in W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3-24e (Michie 2002). The supreme court upheld the validity of the 1995 enactment in State ex rel. Van
Nguyen v. Berger, 483 S.E.2d 71 (W. Va. 1996).
179 See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3-24e(1)(A) (Michie 2002).
180

See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3-24e(2) (Michie 2002).

181

Erie Ins. Prop. and Cas. Co. v. Stage Show Pizza, JTS, Inc., 553 S.E.2d 257, 265 n.8 (W.

Va. 2001).
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Default on Premiums by Subcontractor

Primary contractors and subcontractors have posed special problems for
the workers' compensation system. Experience has shown that some subcontractors have a tendency to default on premium payments. In 1993 the legislature
182
responded to this problem by enacting West Virginia Code section 23-2-1d.
This statute provides that "[I]n the event that such a subcontracting employer
defaults on its obligations to make payments to the commissioner, then such
primary contractor shall be liable for such payments."' 183 The statute provides
circumstances in which a primary contractor
can avoid having to pay the de84
faulted premiums of a subcontractor.1
3.

Maintaining Safe Working Environments

In 1993 the legislature crafted a statute, West Virginia Code section 232B-2,185 designed to help prevent workplace injuries. Under the statute the
Commissioner had authority "to conduct special inspections or investigations
focused on specific problems or hazards in the workplace with or without the
agreement of the employer." 186 In conjunction with such preventive measures,
under certain circumstances the Commissioner could "require the employer to
establish a safety committee composed
of representatives of the employer and
8
the employees of the employer."'1 7

C.

Health Care ProviderReform Measures
1.

Wrongfully Seeking Payment

88
In 1999 the legislature enacted West Virginia Code section 61-3-24g1
to curtail financial abuse of the workers' compensation system by health care
providers. 189 The statute sets out three separate felony offenses involving the

182 The statute was amended in 2003. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-2-id (Michie Supp. 2004).
183 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-2-ld(a) (Michie 2002).
184 See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1 d(b) (Michie 2002).
185 The statute was amended in 2003. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-2B-2 (LexisNexis Supp.
2004).
186 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-2B-2(a) (Michie 2002).
187 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-2B-2(b) (Michie 2002).
188

The statute was amended in 2003. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3-24g (Michie Supp. 2004).

189 The provisions of the statute were actually created in 1993, and codified at W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 23-4-3a (Michie 1994). However, the legislature repealed W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-3a in
1999, and reenacted the provisions of the statute in W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3-24g (Michie 2000).
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90
wrongful receipt of workers' compensation funds by health care providers.
Moreover, a health care provider convicted under the statute is "barred from
providing future services or supplies to injured employees for the purposes of
workers' compensation
and shall cease to receive payment for such services or
19 1
supplies."

2.

Monitoring Health Care Providers

In 1990 the legislature created a health care advisory panel, under West
Virginia Code section 23-4-3b, 192 to assist the Commission in monitoring and
establishing guidelines for health care providers and the services they render.
The advisory panel was specifically empowered to:
(a) Establish guidelines for the health care which is reasonably
required for the treatment of the various types of injuries and
occupational diseases .... (b) Establish protocols and procedures for the performance of examinations or evaluations performed by physicians or medical examiners .... (c) Assist the
commissioner in establishing guidelines for the evaluation of
the care provided by health care providers to injured employees
.... (d) Assist the commissioner in establishing guidelines as to
the anticipated period of disability for the various types of injuries .... (e) Assist the commissioner in establishing appropriate
professional review of requests by health care providers to exceed the guidelines for treatment of injuries and occupational
193
diseases established pursuant to subsection (a) of this section.

3.

Suspending or Terminating Health Care Providers

194
In 1990 the legislature enacted West Virginia Code section 23-4-3c
to empower the Commissioner, under certain circumstances, to "suspend for up
to one year or terminate the right of any health care provider ... to obtain payment for services rendered to injured employees."' 9 The circumstances under
which the Commissioner may exercise this authority include (a) providing ex-

190 See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3- 2 4g(1) to (3) (Michie 2002).
191 W. VA. CODE ANN, § 61-3-24g(5) (Michie 2002).
192 The statute was amended in 2003. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-3b (Michie Supp. 2004).
193 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-3b (Michie 2002).
194 The statute was amended in 2003. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-3c (Michie Supp. 2004).
195

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-3c(a) (Michie 2002).
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cessive or medically unreasonable care to employees, 19 6 (b) charging fees in
excess of the maximum amount established by the Commissioner, 197 (c) prior
suspension or termination of provider's199license, 19 8 and (d) prior conviction of a
crime related to the provider's practice.
VI. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE OF LIBERALITY

As a fundamental point of law, the rule of liberality generally cannot be
used in workers' compensation litigation, absent legislative authority. This is
true because workers' compensation statutes are in derogation of common law
rights.2 0 It has long been the rule that statutes which deny or infringe upon
rights provided by the common law are to be strictly construed-not liberally
construed. 2 0 1 With these points in mind, this part of the article will examine the
statutory creation and legislative repeal of the rule of liberality in the state
workers' compensation system.
A.

Statutory Creationof the Rule ofLiberality

20 2
In construing the workers' compensation statute in Poccardi v. Ott,
the state supreme court made the following observations:

The statute itself relaxes the common law and statutory rules of
evidence and abolishes the technical and formal rules of procedure other than those expressly retained, and requires each
196

See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-3c(a)(1) (Michie 2002).

197
198

See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-3c(a)(2) (Michie 2002).
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-3c(a)(3) (Michie 2002).

199

See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-3c(a)(4) (Michie 2002).

200
This is to say that under the common law, a worker negligently injured on the job had a
right to sue the employer. Further, the common law permitted an employer to raise certain affirmative defenses in litigation brought by an employee. The workers' compensation laws strip an
employee of the right to sue an employer for a negligent injury (with some exceptions), and an
employer cannot use affirmative defenses in workers' compensation litigation. See Mandolidis v.
Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907, 911 (W. Va. 1978) ("The Workmen's Compensation Act was
designed to remove negligently caused industrial accidents from the common law tort system.").
201 See State ex rel. Keller v. Grymes, 64 S.E. 728, 730 (W. Va. 1909) ("Statutes changing the
common law are strictly construed, and it is not further abrogated than the language of the statute
clearly and necessarily requires."). See also Woodrum v. Johnson, 559 S.E.2d 908, 921 n. 10 (W.
Va. 2001) ("It must also be acknowledged that a statute in derogation of common law must be
strictly construed."); City of Fairmont v. Retail, Wholesale, and Dep't Store Union, AFL-CIO,
283 S.E.2d 589, 597 (W. Va. 1980) ("Statutes in derogation of the common law are allowed effect
only to the extent clearly indicated by the terms used. Nothing can be added otherwise than by
necessary implication arising from such terms.").
202
96 S.E. 790 (W. Va. 1918).
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claim to be investigated in such a manner as may best be calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and justly
and liberally effectuate the spiritand purpose of its provisions.
Its object is beneficent and bountiful; its provisions broad and
of a
generous.... Strict rules are not to obtain to the detriment
2 3
0
claimant in violation of these wholesome purposes.
The above passage from Poccardirepresents the first comprehensive statement
compensation laws were to be
by the supreme court that indicated the workers'
20 4
liberally construed in favor of the employee.
The supreme court's determination in Poccardthat the workers' compensation laws were to be liberally construed in favor of employees was due to
the following provision found in the Acts of 1913, which created the workers'
compensation system:
[The] commission shall not be bound by the usual common law
or statutory rules of evidence, or by any technical or formal
rules of procedure, other than herein provided, but may make
investigation in such manner as in its judgment is best calcuand to
lated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties
2 °5
carry outjustly andliberally the spiritof this act.
a liberal construction of workers'
The above provision explicitly authorized
206
compensation laws and evidentiary facts.
The statutory authority to permit administrative and judicial tribunals to
apply the rule of liberality in workers' compensation litigation represented a
sound public policy statement for one reason: when the workers' compensation
system was created, the legislature required both, the employer and employee,
to contributefunds to the system. This fact was established by the Acts of 1913,
wherein the legislature provided that "[the commission shall establish a workmen's compensation fund from premiums paid thereto by employers and employe[e]s ' ' 2 0 7 and that "premiums provided for in this act shall ... be contrib-

203 Id. at 791 (emphasis added).
204

Using terms that were less precise and clear than those used in Poccardi, the Supreme Court

indicated in Culurides v. Ott, 90 S.E. 270 (W. Va. 1916) that workers' compensation laws were to
be liberally construed.
205
1913 W. Va. Acts ch. 10, § 44. (emphasis added).
206

In the case of Machala v. Comp. Comm'r, 155 S.E. 169 (W. Va. 1930), the supreme court

announced that the rule of liberality was to be applied so as to construe evidentiary facts in favor
of employees.
207 1913 W.Va. Acts ch. 10, § 19.
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uted in proportion
of ninety per cent by the employers and ten per cent by the
20 8
employe[e]s."
Requiring employees to pay part of their wages into the workers' compensation system demanded that the system's laws be liberally construed in favor of them. This is so because employers were able to recoup the money they
20 9
paid into the system by proportionately raising the price of their products.
However, employees had no way of recovering the wages that were withheld
from their pay. In the final analysis, only the general consuming public and
employees funded the system, not the employers.
B.

Repeal of Statutory Authority to Use the Rule of Liberality in 1919

It was noted by Justice Browning, in dicta, in the case of Whitt v.
Workmen's Compensation Comm 'r,2 1 that:
Today, there is no provision in the workmen's compensation
law requiring the commissioner, the appeal board, or this Court
to apply the rule of 'liberality' either in construing the workmen's compensation law or appraising the evidence in a workmen's compensation case ....
This Court has apparently ex-

208 1913 W.Va. Acts ch. 10, § 24.
It is generally understood and acknowledged that the underlying monetary principle of
workers' compensation "is to shift the economic cost of work-injuries to the employer and ultimately the consumer." Harding v. Sheridan D. Smith, 647 A.2d 1193, 1194 (Me. 1994), (citing
Scott's Case, 104 A. 794, 797 (Me. 1918)).
209

A new theory has been propounded to challenge the traditional notion that consumers ultimately pay the cost of workers' compensation through higher prices for goods and services. Under
this new theory employees pay the cost of workers' compensation through artificially reduced
wages. See Steven Scott Stephens, Consequences of Expansionary Workers[] Compensation

Policy, 46 LAB. L.J. 17 (1995). Two fundamental problems plague this new theory. First, it is
based upon a theoretical model of the economy which assumes that there is a known optimum
wage for every endeavor, and that employers knowingly pay employees at an ever decreasing
level from the optimum wage. The flaw in this theoretical model is the assumption that there is a
known optimum wage for every endeavor. In the real world employers are not looking for, nor are
they aware of any optimum wage from which they can reduce employee wages for the purpose of
paying for workers' compensation costs. Second, and most importantly, workers' compensation
statutes either explicitly or implicitly prohibit employers from deducting the cost of workers'
compensation from employee wages. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-967, 23-1025 (West
1997) (criminal sanctions for deducting premiums from employee wages); See also ARK. CODE
ANN. § 11-9-109 (Michie 2002); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1516(a) (2001; HAW. REV. STAT. § 386129 (Michie 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.54 (West 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1163 (West
1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.185(5) (West 1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-3-41 (1995); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 39-71-406 (2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-21 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-10
(1995); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 46 (West 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-108(3) (2001).
210

172 S.E.2d 375 (W.Va. 1970).
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tended that rule of liberality to the consideration of evidence in
contested workmen's compensation cases.211
The latter observation by Justice Browning acknowledges that there is no statutory authority for applying the rule of liberality in workers' compensation litigation. In spite of this acknowledgment, the rule of liberality was still applied at
the administrative level and by the supreme court.
1.

Rule of Liberality Repealed in 1919

Within a year of the decision in Poccardi,which held that the legislature expressly required the rule of liberality be applied in workers' compensathe workers' compensation
tion litigation, the legislature promptly amended
2 12
"liberal."
word
the
removing
1919
in
statutes
It is not difficult to discem why the legislature repealed the rule of liberality. This is because, in addition to repealing the rule of liberality, the Acts of
1919 also removed the requirement that employees had to pay a portion of their
213
It is clear that by not obligating employees to pay
wages into the system.
wages into the system, the legislature felt that there was no need to have workers' compensation laws and evidence interpreted liberally in favor of employees.
In spite of the legislative intent that the rule of liberality should not be
applied in workers' compensation litigation, three years after the Acts of 1919
were passed the supreme court held in Sole v. Kindelberger2 14 that
"[c]ompensation acts . . . should be liberally and broadly construed to effect

211

Id. at 377.

212

The Acts of 1913 set out the rule of liberality as follows:

[The] commission shall not be bound by the usual common law or statutory rules of evidence, or
by any technical or formal rules of procedure, other than herein provided, but may make investigation in such manner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the
parties and to carry outjustly and liberallythe spirit of this act.
1913 W. Va. Acts ch. 10, § 44. (emphasis added.)
The Acts of 1919 omitted the requirement of applying the rule of liberality by. using the following
language:

The commissioner shall not be bound by the usual common law or statutory rules of evidence, but
shall adopt formal rules of practice and procedure as herein provided, and may make investigations in such manner as in his judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the
parties and to carry out the provisions of this act.
1919 W. Va. Acts ch. 131, § 44.
213
See 1919 W. Va. Acts ch. 131, §§ 19, 24 (obligating employers to fund the system exclusively).
214
114 S.E. 151 (W.Va. 1922).
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their beneficent purpose." 215 The decision in Sole set precedent for the supreme
court to continue to require application of the rule of liberality in workers' cornto do so.216
pensation litigation, in spite of the removal of statutory authority
2.

Constitutional Problem Posed by Judicial Imposition of the
Rule of Liberality in Workers' Compensation Litigation

Unquestionably, the lack of statutory authority to apply the rule of liberality in workers' compensation litigation presents a state constitutional problem.
The supreme court recognized that the workers' compensation statute is "in
derogation of the common law .... ",217 This point is significant because of the
statute in derogation of the common law must be
common law rule that,,2"[a]
18
The common law rule requiring strict constructionof
strictly construed ....
statutes in derogation of the common law is set aside only "where the plain
meaning of the2 19words of the statute indicate the Legislature is changing the
common law."

The supreme court noted in Seagraves v. Legg, 220 that "[t]he common
law, if not repugnant of the Constitution of this State, continues as the law of
this State unless it is altered or changed by the Legislature." 221 The common
in derogation of the common
law rule, requiring strict construction of statutes
222
state.
this
in
law
valid
and
law, is operative
The Acts of 1913 explicitly evidenced the legislature's intent to change
the common law rule of strict construction in order to permit the rule of liberality to be applied in workers' compensation litigation. However, the Acts of 1919
expressly removed authority to apply the rule of liberality in workers' compensation litigation. Consequently, Sole and its progeny are constitutionally suspect
as legal authority for imposing the rule of liberality in workers' compensation
litigation. The common law rule of strict construction should have been applied

215

Id. at 153. See also Caldwell v. State Comp. Comm'r, 144 S.E. 568 (W.Va. 1928).

216

"In Machala v. State Comp. Comm'r, 155 S.E. 169 (W. Va. 1930), the rule was extended to

the construction and interpretation of evidence." Whitt v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 172
S.E.2d 375, 377 (W. Va. 1970).
Sole, 114 S.E. at 153.
217
218

Syl. Pt. 1, in part, Newhart v. Pennybacker, 200 S.E. 350 (W. Va. 1938).

219

Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338, 340 (W. Va. 1978) (citation omitted).

220

127 S.E.2d 605 (W. Va. 1962).

221

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

222

See Teter v. Old Colony Co., 441 S.E.2d 728, 741 (W. Va. 1994) ("We have traditionally

held that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed.").

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2004

45

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 107, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 6
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 107

in workers' compensation
litigation after the 1919 amendments to the workers'
223
compensation statutes.
VII. ASSESSING

THE IMPACT OF AN ABUSIVE USE OF THE RULE OF LIBERALITY

The workers' compensation system is a necessary mechanism that helps
to assure the growth and stability of the state's economy by providing health
benefits for injured workers. The destruction of the system, through fiscal bankruptcy, would unsettle the foundation of the state's economy. At the start of the
1990's the legislature read the handwriting on the wall: The workers' compensation system was running blindly into the arms of bankruptcy.
In response to the mathematically determined bleak future of the workers'compensation system, the legislature moved with blinding speed in the
2 24
1990's in an attempt to correct longstanding fiscal loopholes in the system.
However, as previously discussed, the fiscal reform measures of the 1990's
failed. This fact is evident because the legislature returned to the drawing board
in 2003, to institute additional changes in the system. A key factor in the failure
of the reform measures of the 1990's was the expansive and abusive application
of the judicially imposed rule of liberality.
To be clear, the rule of liberality is not inherently destructive. The rule
becomes a fiscal nightmare when it is applied unnecessarily and abusively. This
part of the article focuses upon three issues: (1) how the rule of liberality works,
(2) who relies upon the rule, and (3) the abusive application of the rule in two
recent cases.
A.

UnderstandingHow the Rule ofLiberality Generally Works

In theory, an•225
employee seeking workers' compensation benefits has the
burden of persuasion.
An employee's burden of proof has been stated in different ways by the supreme court. In Machala v. State Compensation Commissioner,226 it was held that an employee had to establish his/her claim by "a satisfactory and convincing showing . ,227 However, in Morris v. State Compen223 See W. VA. CONST. art. 8, § 13 (2002); W. Va. Code § 2-1-1 (2002).
224 See the discussion in Part V of this article.
225

See Syl. Pt. 2, Sowder v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r., 189 S.E.2d 674 (W.Va. 1972)

("A claimant in a workmen's compensation case must bear the burden of proving his claim ....).
The burden of persuasion requires a party to prove an issue or fact. See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S.
624 (1988).
One jurisdiction explicitly imposes the burden of persuasion on the employer. See Tate v. GTE
Hawaiian Tele. Co., 881 P.2d 1246 (Haw. 1994).
226 151 S.E. 313 (W. Va. 1930).
227 Id. at 315.
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228

sation Commissioner, the supreme court indicated that "it is incumbent upon
the claimant to establish her claim by a preponderance of the evidence .... ,,229
Finally, in Hayes v. State Compensation Director,23 it was held that "[a]n

award of a claim cannot be made in a workmen's compensation case unless it is
supported by satisfactory proof ....,231
For the purposes here, "[i]t is not necessary to determine .. whether
'satisfactory,' 'convincing,' and 'preponderance,' . . . are synonymous."2 32
228

64 S.E.2d 496 (W. Va. 1951).

229

Id. at 498.

230

140 S.E.2d 443 (W. Va. 1965).

231

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

232

Whitt, 172 S.E.2d at 378.

The employee's burden of proof in other jurisdictions is either by statute or judicial determination.
For jurisdictions statutorily establishing an employee's burden of proof see ALA. CODE § 25-581(c) (2000) (preponderance); ARK. CODE ANN.. §§ 11-9-102(4)(E)(i-ii), 11-9-704(c)(2) & 11-9705(a)(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003) (preponderance); CAL. LAB. CODE § 3202.5 (Deering's Supp.
2004) (preponderance); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-43-201 (2003) (preponderance); Kan. Stat. Ann. §
44-508(g) (Supp. 2003) (preponderance); MICH. Cone. LAWS. ANN. § 418.851 (2001) (preponderance); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.02 1(la) (West Supp. 2004) (preponderance); NEV.REV.STAT.
§ 616C.150 (2003) (preponderance); OR. REV. STAT. § 656.726(4)(f)(B) (2001) (preponderance);
TEx. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.303 (Vernon's 1996) (preponderance); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-14603(a) (LexisNexis 2003) (preponderance).
For jurisdictions judicially establishing an employee's burden of proof see Harp v. ARCO Alaska,
Inc., 831 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1992) (preponderance); Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wis. v. Indus. Comm'n, 565 P.2d 1300 (Ariz. 1977) (preponderance); Tutsky v. YMCA of Greenwich, 612
A.2d 1222 (Conn. App. 1992) (preponderance); Histed v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 621
A.2d 340 (Del. 1993) (preponderance); Stewart v. D.C. Dep't of Employment. Servs., 606 A.2d
1350 (D.C. 1992) (substantial); Schafrath v. Marco Bay Resort, LTD, 608 So. 2d 97 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1992) (competent); Maloney v. Gordon County Farms, 462 S.E.2d 606 (Ga. 1995) (preponderance); Evans v. Hara's, Inc., 849 P.2d 934 (Idaho 1993) (preponderance); Il. Bell Tel. Co. v.
Indus. Comm'n, 638 N.E.2d 307 (I11.
App. Ct. 1994) (preponderance); Roebel v. Dana Corp., 638
N.E.2d 1356 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (preponderance); Miedema v. Dial Corp., 551 N.W.2d 309
(Iowa 1996) (preponderance); Union Underwear Co., Inc. v. Scearce, 896 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. 1995)
(substantial); Kennedy v. Sec. Indus. Ins. Co., 623 So. 2d 174 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (preponderance); Rowe v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 428 A.2d 71 (Me. 1981) (preponderance); S.B. Thomas,
Inc. v. Thompson, 689 A.2d 1301 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (preponderance); Trefrey's Case,
359 N.E.2d 652 (Mass. App. Ct. 1977) (preponderance); Hedge v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 641 So.
2d 9 (Miss. 1994) (preponderance); Montgomery v. Mo. Dep't Corr. & Human. Res., 849 S.W.2d
267 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (preponderance); Chaney v. U.S. Fid. & Guar., 917 P.2d 912 (Mont.
1996) (preponderance); Gray v. Fuel Econ. Contracting Co., 464 N.W.2d 366 (Neb. 1991) (preponderance); Appeal of Chickering, 693 A.2d 1169 (N.H. 1997) (preponderance); Kertesz v.
Korsh, 686 A.2d 368 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (preponderance); Lujan v. Circle K Corp.,
616 P.2d 432 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (preponderance); Bochkarev v. Henry's Landscaping Serv.,
200 N.Y.S.2d 100 (1960) (preponderance); Phillips v. U.S. Air, Inc., 463 S.E.2d 259 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1995) (preponderance); Moses v. N.D. Workers' Comp. Bureau, 429 N.W.2d 436 (N.D.
1988) (preponderance); Banks v. LTV Steel Co., 654 N.E.2d 439 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (preponderance); Wald v. Roto Rooter, 910 P.2d 354 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995) (preponderance); Wertz v.
Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd., 683 A.2d 1287 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996) (preponderance); Fox v.
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What is necessary to understand is that in practice, application of the rule of

liberality in workers' compensation litigation shifts the employee's burden of
persuasion onto the employer. However, decisions by the supreme court have
repeatedly denied that this in fact occurs. 233 Such assertions are "grounded in

blind adherence to fictional legal form, that sacrifices concrete legal substance." '2 34 Under the rule of liberality whenever there is any ambiguity in a
workers' compensation statute or evidentiary uncertainty, doubt is resolved in

favor of the employee. 235 In the final analysis, what this means is that an employer must always "persuade" the fact finder that there is no ambiguity in a

statute or there is no evidentiary uncertainty in a case. Shifting the burden this
way is tantamount to a criminal defendant having the burden of proving his/her
innocence. Simply put, it is fundamentally unfair.
United States SuThe conclusion is consistent with the decision by the236Thdeiinn
preme Court in Director, OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries. The decision in
Director, OWCP involved two cases from the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit that were consolidated. In both cases the Third Circuit reversed administratively granted employee compensation awards, concluding that
application of the "true doubt" rule 237 in both cases unfairly shifted the burden
Newberry County Mem'l Hosp., 451 S.E.2d 28 (S.C. 1994) (preponderance); Joffer v. Crusy's
Power Brake & Supply, Inc., 156 N.W.2d 189 (S.D. 1968) (preponderance); Oster v. Yates, 845
S.W.2d 215 (Tenn. 1992) (preponderance); Lipman v. Indus. Comm'n, 592 P.2d 616 (Utah 1979)
(preponderance); Shaw v. Dutton Berry Farm, 632 A.2d 18 (Vt. 1993) (reasonable); Falls Church
Constr. Corp. v. Valle, 464 S.E.2d 517 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (preponderance); Belnap v. Boeing
Co., 823 P.2d 528 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (preponderance); Cornwell Personnel Assoc., Ltd. v.
Labor & Indus, Review Comm'n, 499 N.W.2d 705 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (substantial).
233 See Smith v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r., 189 S.E.2d 838 (W. Va. 1972); Clark v.
State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 187 S.E.2d 213 (W. Va. 1972); Barnett v. State Workmen's
Comp. Comm'r, 172 S.E.2d 698 (W. Va. 1970); Bilchak v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 168
S.E.2d 723 (W. Va. 1969); Hosey v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 151 S.E.2d 729 (W. Va. 1966);
Emmel v. State Comp. Dir., 145 S.E.2d 29 (W.Va. 1965); Deverick v. State Comp. Dir., 144
S.E.2d 498 (W. Va. 1965).
234 Fayette County Nat'l Bank v. Lilly, 484 S.E.2d 232, 236 n.8 (W. Va. 1997).
235

See Rachel Courtney, Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v, Greenwich

Collieries: The Reasonsfor and Ramifications of Eliminating "'TrueDoubt", 49 ADMIN. L. REV.
223, 226-227 (1997) ("[Wjhen courts construe either ambiguous statutory language or ambiguous
evidence [in workers' compensation litigation], they .. .resolv[e] ambiguities in a manner that
favors claimants.").
236 114 S. Ct. 2251 (1994). For further discussion of this case see Jeffrey Thomas Skinner,
Resolving the Doubt About the True Doubt Rule in Director, Office of Workers' Compensation
Programsv. Greenwich Collieries,73 N.C. L. REv. 1299 (1995).
237
The true doubt rule is a phrase that may be used interchangeably with the rule of liberality
and operates on evidentiary facts exactly the same as the rule of liberality. See Greenwich Collieries v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 990 F.2d 730, 732 (3d Cir. 1993), aff'd 114 S.
Ct. 2251 (1994) ("The premise underlying the true doubt rule ...is that compensatory statutes...
should provide indemnity in cases of faultless injury at the worksite and therefore should be interpreted liberally in favor of the claimant ....Thus the true doubt rule has become a shorthand and
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of persuasion to the employers. 238 The question presented to the Supreme Court
in Director,OWCP, was "whether the [true doubt rule] is consistent with § 7(c)
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which states that '[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of a [claim] has the burden of
proof."239
Much of the opinion in Director,OWCP was devoted to explaining how
the phrase "burden of proof' was synonymous with "burden of persuasion."
Eventually, the Supreme Court concluded in a rather terse manner: "Under the.
.. true doubt rule, when the evidence is evenly balanced the claimant wins. Under § 7(c), however, when the evidence is evenly balanced, the benefits claimant
must lose. Accordingly, we hold that the true doubt rule violates § 7(c) of the
APA.240
The Supreme Court's decision to reject the true doubt rule in Director,
OWCP represents a departure and rebuke of the fictitious legal perception by
some federal courts that the true doubt rule did not shift the ultimate burden of
persuasion to employers. 24 1 An equally fictitious legal notion that must be discarded is the alleged placebo affect of the rule of liberality on the burden of
proof in workers' compensation litigation. The rule of liberality shifts the burden of persuasion to employers in the exact same manner as the true doubt rule.
B.

Reliance on the Rule ofLiberality by MalingeringEmployees

The purpose of the workers' compensation reform measures of the
1990's was not that of denying benefits to employees who were legitimately
entitled to such benefits. Reform measures were intended, in part, to cut off avenues of access to benefits by employees who were not entitled to benefits outright or to the level of benefits they sought. This point is crucial to understand in
the context of the rule of liberality, because as shown, the rule unquestionably
shifts the burden of persuasion to the employer.
Employees who are legitimately entitled to workers' compensation
benefits rarely need ....
the rule of liberality
242 to obtain such benefits, and therefore
The rule of liberality is, and always has
do not engage in protracted litigation.
convenient method utilized by some courts and administrative agencies to allocate the ultimate
burden of persuasion, i.e., the risk of non-persuasion, to the employer .. ")(citation omitted).
238 The claims were filed respectively under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act and the Black Lung Benefits Act.
239 Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 114 S.Ct. at 2253, (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 556(d)).
240

Id. at 2259.

241 See Avondale Shipyards, Inc. v. Kennel, 914 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1990); Parsons Corp. of Cal.
v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 619 F.2d 38 (9th Cir. 1980); Bath Iron Works Corp.
v. White, 584 F.2d 569 (1st Cir. 1978).
242 Somewhere along the workers' compensation time-line one of the system's building blocks
was lost. A major theme heralding the creation of workers' compensation was that it was not
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been, the tool of employees who are not legitimately entitled to the workers'

compensation benefits they seek. It is the never ending pool of malingering employees who drain untold millions of dollars out of the workers' compensation

system while seeking endless medical treatment for phantom injuries. 243 And,
too, it is this pool of employees who cause good employers
• to •resort244to any
means necessary to evade ever rising workers' compensation premiums.

By maintaining an abuse application of the rule of liberality in workers'
compensation litigation, the reform measures of the 1990's simply could not

fulfill their purpose of saving the system from fiscal bankruptcy. This is because
unbridled application of the rule of liberality kept malingering employees standgo away so long as the
ing tall in front of the benefits trough. 245 They would 24not
6
rule of liberality doled out unearned benefits to them.
One commentator has postured that the allure of workers'247Th
compensation
lueo
The lure of
monetary benefits has created a moral hazard for employees.
benefits cause employees to engage in conduct that is morally (not to mention

fiscally) hazardous. According to this commentator the theory of "moral hazard
is most likely to be reflected in exaggerated severity and duration of disability
supposed to be litigious. This theme has been destroyed. One commentary politely noted "that
employees have been increasingly litigious in the workers' compensation area." Nancy Kubasek
& Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, California's Radical Proposal: A Model for the Fifty States? 42
LAB. L.J. 173, 174 (1991). See Cecily Raibom & Dinah Payne, The Big Dark Cloud of Workers'
Compensation:Does It Have a Silver Lining? 44 LAB. L.J. 554, 557 (1993) ("A... basic problem
with workers' compensation is the intense barrage of workers' compensation litigation."). In West
Virginia, as in all jurisdictions that still cling to the rule of liberality, the only reason unmanageable litigation stifles the workers' compensation system is because of the rule of liberality. The
rule promotes litigation because its ultimate purpose is to award unearned benefits.
243 For example, a "study by the Workers' Compensation Research Institute disclosed that the
medical costs of workers' compensation claims are increasing 5% faster annually than are general
health care costs." Barry D. Whelchel, Deformation of Workers' Compensation: The California
Experience, 41 LAB. L.J. 831 (1990). See H. Douglas Jones & Cathy Jackson, Cumulative Trauma
Disorders: A Repetitive Strain on the Workers' Compensation System, 20 N. Ky. L. REv. 765
(1993), reprinted in 17 WORKERS COMP. L. REv. 319, 333 (1994) (discussing a study which indicated that "patients covered by workers' compensation had slower initial improvement and remained off work for longer periods of time than non-compensation patients with the same or
similar symptoms.").
244 "The state establishes the obligation and its amount without the employer's consent and the
employer must pay, on pain of substantial civil and even criminal, sanctions." James B. Haines,
Jr., Employers' Workmens 's Compensation Obligations and the Bankruptcy Tax Priority, 85 W.
VA. L. REV. 97, 111 (1982).
245 "While some workers do not return to work when they could, a more distressing problem is
that some workers' compensation claims are originally fraudulent." Raibom & Payne, supra note
242, at 558. The rule of liberality will unabashedly compensate the malingerer and defrauder,
because they are the only persons who need it in order to obtain benefits.
246 See generally,Bradley A. Crouser, Reopenings and Modification in West Virginia Workers'
Compensation Claims:A Practitioner'sGuide, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 889 (1990).
247 Stephens, supra note 209, at 23-26.
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24 8
The
and in claiming... benefits for non-work injuries or physical problems."
net effect of moral hazard conduct was stated as follows:

The result of the prevalence of moral hazard is that increases in
benefit levels reduce the efficiency of the system, because individuals not entitled to receive benefits take them nevertheless..
. [I]n order to achieve a set level of increased benefit to legitimate workers, premiums must be increased by significantly
more than the additional amount the injured workers receive.
In the final analysis, conduct coming within the framework of the moral hazard
made morally correct through the abusive application of
theory is supported and
250
liberality.
of
the rule
C.

McKenzie and Repass IllustrateAbusive Use of the Rule of Liberality

Two recent opinions by the supreme court illustrate the harsh economic
downside of abusive and unbridled application of the rule of liberality. 25 1 The
ex rel. McKenzie v. Smith 252 and Repass v. Workers' Comtwo cases are State253
pensation Division.
1.

The McKenzie Decision

The claimant in McKenzie strained his back at work and filed a claim
for workers' compensation benefits. The claimant was eventually awarded fifteen percent permanent partial disability benefits. 254 The claimant requested on
three occasions that the Commission authorize him to receive rehabilitation services. 255 Under a rule promulgated by the Commission, employers selected rehabilitation service providers for employees. 6 The claimant in the case was
248 Id. at 23.
249

Id. at 24.

Moral hazard injuries, clothed in the armor of the rule of liberality, have brought about "a
proliferation of the number of 'acceptable' work-related injuries, many of which are difficult to..
. disprove--especially in the more 'liberal' jurisdictions." Raiborn & Payne, supra note 242, at
557.
251 Then Chief Justice Davis and Justice Maynard dissented in both cases.
250

252

569 S.E.2d 809 (W. Va. 2002).

253

569 S.E.2d 162 (W. Va. 2002).

254

McKenzie, 569 S.E.2d at 813-14.

255

Id. at 814.

256

Id. at 813.
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denied rehabilitation services by a service provider after each request. 257 The
claimant subsequently filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the supreme
court challenging
the authority of employers to select rehabilitation service pro25 8
viders.
While the case was pending before the supreme court, the claimant was
granted rehabilitation services. In spite of this fact, the supreme court chose not
to dismiss the case as moot. Instead, the supreme court decided to address the
issue of whether the Commission had authority to allow employers 259
to submit
names of rehabilitation service providers that employees had to utilize.
Justice Starcher, writing for the majority, held that there was no statutory authority for the Commission to utilize a list of employer preferred rehabilitation service providers. The majority opinion found that under W.Va. Code
section 23-4-3(b), an employer is prohibited from entering into any contract
with a health care provider for purposes of providing rehabilitation services for
an employee. The majority ultimately concluded that under W.Va. Code section
23-4-3b), a claimant has a right to select his/her rehabilitation service provider.z o
Chief Justice Davis dissented from the decision in McKenzie on several
grounds. First, the Chief Justice argued that the majority opinion failed to make
a distinction between physical and vocational rehabilitation services. The dissent
contended that the Commission could not use an employer's preferred list for
physical rehabilitation, but that nothing in the statutes prevented the Commission from using an employer's preferred list for vocational rehabilitation. 26 1 The
dissent's position was summarized on this point as follows:
While the majority correctly notes that W. Va. Code § 23-4-3(b)
grants a claimant the right "to select his or her initial health
care provider for treatment of a compensable injury or disease"
(emphasis added), it proceeds to then misapply this provision to
conclude that it grants a claimant the exclusive right to select a
vocational rehabilitation service provider. It is plainly evident
that a vocational rehabilitation service provider, under its statutory definition as well as common nomenclature, is not a health
care provider. Vocational rehabilitation services are limited to
"vocational or on-the-job training, counseling, assistance in obtaining appropriate temporary or permanent work site, work duties or work hours modification[.]" W. Va. Code § 23-4-9(b).
257

Jd. at 814-16.

258

Id. at 813.

259

Id. at 817-18.

260

Id. at 822.

261

McKenzie, 569 S.E.2d at 828-29 (Davis, C.J., dissenting).
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Nothing in this description refers to health care, thus there is absolutely no statutory support for granting a claimant the right to
select a vocational counselor under the guise of selecting 62an initial health care provider under W. Va. Code § 23-4-3(b).2
The Chief Justice next argued that the writ of mandamus issued by the
majority opinion, was not appropriate when dealing with discretionary conduct
by a state official. The dissent addressed the point as follows:
Because the actions of the Commissioner were discretionary, it
was improper for the majority to grant the writ of mandamus to
impose its own judgment over that of the Commissioner. This
Court has "characterized the purpose of the writ [of mandamus]
as the enforcement of an established right and the enforcement
of a corresponding imperative duty created or imposed by law."
Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Ball v. Cummings, 208 W. Va. 393, 398,
540 S.E.2d 917, 922 (1999) (citing State ex rel. Bronaugh v.
City of Parkersburg,148 W. Va. 568, 136 S.E.2d 783 (1964))..
. The majority's holding in this case merely corrected a perceived error committed by the Commissioner in exercising his
discretionary authority. In the absence of a finding that the
Commissioner's actions were arbitrary or capricious, it was
simply wrong to use the extraordinary remedy of mandamus in
this manner. The ultimate result of the majority decision in this
case is to overrule a long line of precedent prohibiting the use of
a writ of mandamus to dictate the manner in which a government agency should exercise its discretionary authority. The
majority has mandated the precise manner in which the Commissioner may exercise his discretion to develop a method for
selecting vocational rehabilitation service providers, by permitting only claimants to make the selection. The majority's decision has made the writ of mandamus a tool to be used by the
Court [sic] to control any and every government action it desires. This new extension of the writ of mandamus has no constitutional basis, and is a real and dangerous threat to the separa263
tion of powers doctrine embodied in this state's constitution.
The last issue taken up by the Chief Justice was that the majority inappropriately used the rule of liberality to engage in legislative law making. The
dissent addressed the issue as follows:

262

Id. at 829.

263

Id. at 830-31.
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Finally, and most troubling, is the majority's reliance on the
rule of liberality as justification to rewrite statutes in this case.
In this and other workers' compensation cases recently decided
by this Court [sic], a majority of its members have demonstrated a disturbing trend of touting the liberality rule to rationalize overstepping this Court's authority in order to achieve desired goals. See, e.g., Martin v. Workers' Comp. Div., 210 W.
Va. 270, 285, 557 S.E.2d 324, 339 (2001) (Maynard, J., dissenting) (observing that this Court [sic] "routinely cites the liberality rule and uses it to justify its decisions in workers' compensation appeals."). Contrary to this unabashed exploitation, the rule
of liberality has historically been used in workers' compensation cases in a manner that did not sacrifice basic legal principles and trample upon the authority of the legislative and executive branches of government .... I am at a loss as to what it will
take for the majority to realize that there is a future generation
of workers who will need the services of a healthy and viable
workers' compensation system. The decision in this case is simply another step by the majority in a journey leading ultimately
to a workers' compensation system so afflicted by unreasonable
laws that it will become utterly incapable of providing legitimate claimants with the benefits and services they so desper264
ately need.

2.

The Repass Decision

In the Repass opinion two claimants suffered back injuries. The Commission granted five percent permanent partial disability ("PPD") benefits to
both claimants, based upon medical results using the Diagnostic-Related Estimate ("DRE") model. The Commission had promulgated a rule which required
use of the DRE model, because the American Medical Association's, Guides to
the Evaluation of PermanentImpairment, (4th Ed. 1993) found the DRE model
to be more objective and accurate than the Range of Motion ("ROM") model. In
each case, the Office of Judges ("OOJ") found that examinations conducted
under the DRE model were unreliable. The OOJ determined that, based upon its
own internal rule, the ROM model should be used when performing back injury
ratings and not the DRE model. The OOJ granted one claimant nine percent
PPD and the other claimant sixteen percent PPD, based upon the ROM model.
The employer in each case appealed, and the Appeal Board found the DRE

264

Id. at

831-32.
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method of examination to be valid, and reinstated the original awards
granted by
265
the Commission. The claimants appealed to the supreme court.
Justice McGraw, writing for the majority, found that the Commission
could not promulgate a rule requiring the use of the DRE model as recommended by the American Medical Association. Instead, the majority opinion
concluded that an administrative decision issued
by the OOJ, requiring exclu266
sive use of the ROM model, was to be enforced.
Chief Justice Davis dissented from the majority decision on several
grounds. 267 The Chief Justice believed that the decision reached by the majority
opinion was done inconsistently with the judicial powers of the Court. The dissent wrote:
[T]he Court completely ignores the directives of the workers'
compensation legislation, which it claims to uphold, and proceeds to substitute its own judgment in its stead as to the most
reliable indicator of an injured claimant's compensable disability. Not only has the majority successfully turned the rule of
liberality into a rule of laissez-faire,but it also has failed to recognize that the very result of this ruling
will hurt, rather than
2 68
help, the injured workers of this State.
The dissenting opinion outlined the laws which gave the Commission
the authority to promulgate the rule requiring the use of the DRE model. 269 The
Chief Justice then concluded that "[r]ather than according deference to the Legislature and its attendant entities charged with administering the West Virginia
workers' compensation system, the Court takes it upon itself to impermissibly
sit as a superlegislature and replace the Commissioner's well-informed guidelines with its preferred method of impairment evaluation for spinal injury
claims."

27 0

Chief Justice Davis also argued that the majority opinion was wrong in
relying upon the OOJ's rule that barred use of the DRE model. The dissent
wrote:
Moreover, the majority has erred not only by refusing to defer
to the Commissioner but by further imbuing the [OOJ] with
rule-making powers which the Legislature never intended it to
265

Repass, 569 S.E.2d at 167-68.

266

Id. at 179.

267

See Repass, 569 S.E.2d at 181 (Davis, C.J., dissenting).

268

Id.

269

Id. at 181-82.

270

Id. at 182-83.
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possess. Throughout its Opinion, the Court references the now
infamous Cottrell decision wherein the Chief Administrative
Law Judge determined the DRE model of impairment evaluation to be unreliable and announced his intention to disregard
such evidence in future claims. My colleagues then laud this
position as being the surest course to achieving the legislative
objective of providing relief to ailing claimants. Ironically,
though, the Legislature never intended to accord decisions of
the OOJ such deference as it specifically prohibits that entity
from formulating, establishing, or otherwise adopting any rule
or regulation: "The office of judges shall not have the power to
initiate or to promulgate legislative rules[.]" W. Va. Code § 235-8(e) (2001) (Supp. 2001) (emphasis added). As the OOJ is
not, and never has been, imbued with such rule-making authority, the majority's decision to rely upon and embrace the
271
Cottrell ruling is just plain wrong.
The dissent went further in arguing that "[I]t is apparent that, insofar as the
majority of the Court is concerned, accuracy and reliability have no place in
rating back impairments if the evaluation criteria leading thereto does not
consistently award the injured claimant the highest disability rating and,
27 2
consequently, the biggest workers' compensation benefits check."
3.

Implications of McKenzie and Repass

In Justice Maynard's brief dissenting opinion in McKenzie and Repass
(he filed one dissent for both cases), he summarized his position on the effects
of both cases as follows:
Over the past several years, the Legislature has taken steps to
place the workers' compensation system back on solid financial
footing. This Court [sic], by issuing opinions like McKenzie and
Repass, has done the opposite. In the midst of this hot, dry summer, one easily imagines the Legislature furiously fighting to
subdue the wildfires of workers' compensation unfunded liability while, at the same time, a majority of this Court [sic] pours
273
gasoline on the fire.
McKenzie and Repass are dangerous opinions for two reasons. First,
both cases will result in significant and unnecessary long-term expenditures
271

Id. at

272

Id. at 185.

273

McKenzie, 569 S.E.2d at 828 (Maynard, J.,
dissenting).

183-84.
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from the workers' compensation fund. The decision in Repass demands that
back injury impairment ratings be used, with a method that the medical profession has expressly found to grossly over-inflate actual impairment. Conse-

quently, in the long-term Repass will dispense millions upon millions of dollars
to claimants for inflated back impairment. McKenzie will cause permanent total
disability awards to increase ten-fold. This will occur because claimants, who
can be vocationally rehabilitated, will invariably choose vocational rehabilitation service providers who will routinely find that the claimants cannot be retrained and must, therefore, receive permanent total disability benefits.
The second reason that McKenzie and Repass are institutionally threatening precedents, involves the manner in which the majority reached their decisions. No law supported the decision in McKenzie or Repass. To reach the result
in both cases, the majority had to impose the rule of liberality in manner that has
never been done in the history of the court. In short, McKenzie and Repass used
the rule of liberality to not only write legislation, but to write legislation that
undermines all legislative fiscal reform measures. This point is not trivial.
McKenzie and Repass represent the belief that no limitations are imposed on the
rule of liberality. With this abusive view of the rule of liberality, the majority on
the court has empowered itself to "sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom
or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither
affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines." 274 However, historically recognized constitutional principles dictate that the "Court does not sit as a
superlegislature, commissioned to pass upon the political, social, economic, or
scientific merits of statutes pertaining to proper subjects of legislation. It is the
duty of the legislature
to consider facts, establish policy, and embody that policy
75
2

in legislation."

VIII. ABOLISHING

THE JUDICIALLY IMPOSED RULE OF LIBERALITY IN

2003

It was pointed out in Part VI of this article that the legislature abolished
the rule of liberality in 1919, but the supreme court continued to require application of the rule. In this part of the article two issues are discussed. First, a brief
review is provided of how a growing minority of jurisdictions have effectively
abolished the rule of liberality. Second, a discussion will be provided on the

274

Lewis v. Canaan Valley Resorts, Inc., 408 S.E.2d 634, 642 (W.Va. 1991).

275

Boyd v. Merritt, 354 S.E.2d 106, 108 (W.Va. 1986). See Zelenka v. City of Weirton, 539

S.E.2d 750, 755 (W. Va. 2000); State ex rel. Blankenship v. Richardson, 474 S.E.2d 906, 911 (W.
Va. 1996); City of Kenova v. Bell Atlantic-West Virginia, Inc., 473 S.E.2d 141, 148 (W. Va.
1996); Wetzel County Solid Waste Auth. v. W. Va. Div. of Natural Res., 462 S.E.2d 349, 357 (W.
Va. 1995); O'Dell v. Town of Gauley Bridge, 425 S.E.2d 551, 558 (W. Va. 1992); Robinson v.
Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 414 S.E.2d 877, 883 (W. Va. 1991); Tony P. Sellitti Constr. Co.
v. Caryl, 408 S.E.2d 336, 345 (W. Va. 1991); Randall v. Fairmont City Police Dep't, 412 S.E.2d
737, 746 (W. Va. 1991).
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attempt by the state legislature in 2003, to abolish the judicially imposed rule of
liberality.
A.

PrecedentsForAbolishing the Rule ofLiberality

In the 1990's a growing minority of legislatures around the country responded to judicial and administrative abuse of the rule of liberality. In doing

so, they affirmatively abolished the rule of liberality in workers' compensation
litigation.276 The statutory precedents for abolishing the rule of liberality in

workers' compensation litigation vary in their choice of words. 277 However,
ultimately all of the statutes convey the message found in the workers' compensation statute of Maine:
In interpreting this Act, the board shall construe it so as to en-

sure the efficient delivery of compensation to injured employees
at a reasonable cost to employers. All workers' compensation
cases must be decided on their merits and the rule of liberal
construction does not apply. Accordingly, this Act is not to be

given a construction in favor of the employee, nor are the rights
and interests8 of the employer to be favored over those of the
27
employee.
A critical factor in the determination of legislatures to abolish the rule of
liberality, involved a rejection of the time-worn false assumption that workers'

compensation laws are remedial. As a general rule "[r]emedial statutes are liberally construed ... ."279 However, legislatures around the country have challenged the time-worn notion that workers' compensation laws are remedial. The
Minnesota legislature disposed of this legal myth as follows:
The workers' compensation system ... is based on a mutual re-

nunciation of common law rights and defenses by employers
276

See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 11-9-704(c)(3) & 11-9-704(c)(4) (LexisNexis 2002); COLO. REV.

STAT. § 8-43-201 (2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.015 (West Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-923 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501(g) (2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 153(3) (West
2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.001 (West 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-105(4) (2003);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 616A.010 (2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-5-1 (Michie 2003); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 65-01-01 (2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 656.012(3) (2003); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-101(b)
(LexisNexis 2003).
277
The United States Supreme Court's decision to abolish the true doubt rule in Dir., Office of
Workers' Comp. Programs, discussed supra, represents the first judicial abolishment of a rule that
permitted employees to prevail in workers' compensation litigation, even though they failed to
carry their burden of proof.
278
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 153(3) (West 2001).
279

NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 60.01 (6th Ed. 2001).
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and employees alike. Employees rights to sue for damages over
and above medical and health care benefits and wage loss benefits are to a certain degree limited by [law] . . . and employers'
rights to raise common law defenses such as lack of negligence,
contributory negligence on the part of the employee, and others,
are curtailed as well. Accordingly, the legislature hereby declares that the workers' compensation laws are not remedial in
280
any sense ....
The position taken by the Minnesota legislature has been implicitly acknowledged by all jurisdictions that have abolished the rule of liberality in workers'
compensation litigation.
B.

The Legislature'sAttempt to Bar Use of a Judicially Imposed Rule of
Liberality

In 2003 the legislature enacted two provisions which purport to abolish
the use of the rule of liberality in workers' compensation litigation. First, in
West Virginia Code section 23-1-1(b) the following was enacted:
It is the specific intent of the Legislature that workers' compensation cases shall be decided on their merits and that a rule of
"liberal construction" based on any "remedial" basis of workers'
compensation legislation shall not affect the weighing of evidence in resolving such cases .... Accordingly, the Legislature
hereby declares that any remedial component of the workers'
compensation laws is not to cause the workers' compensation
laws to receive liberal construction that alters in any way the
proper weighing of evidence ....
Second, the legislature provided the following in West Virginia Code section
23-4-lg(b):
[A] claim for compensation filed pursuant to this chapter must
be decided on its merit and not according to any principle that
requires statutes governing workers' compensation to be liberally construed because they are remedial in nature. No such
principle may be used in the application of law to the facts of a
case arising out of this chapter or in determining the constitutionality of this chapter.
At first blush, both of the above provisions would appear to have effectively abolished the use of the judicially imposed rule of liberality. However, as
280

MINN. STAT. ANN. §

176.001 (West 1993). (emphasis added.)
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will be shown, West Virginia Code sections 23-1-1(b) & 23-4-lg(b) abolish the
rule of liberality in form only, not in substance.
In its attempt to abolish the rule of liberality, the legislature failed to
understand how the rule operates. This point is made clear from a review of the
2003 enactment of West Virginia Code section 23-4-lg(a). This provision states
in relevant part:
[R]esolution of any issue raised in administering this chapter
shall be based on a weighing of all evidence pertaining to the issue and a finding that a preponderance of the evidence supports
the chosen manner of resolution.... If, after weighing all of the
evidence regarding an issue in which a claimant has an interest,
there is a finding that an equal amount of evidentiary weight exists favoring conflicting matters for resolution, the resolution
that is most consistent with the claimant's position will be
adopted.
A plain reading of West Virginia Code section 23-4-1 g(a) unquestionably shows that it embodies the substance of the rule of liberality. The first part
of the statute shifts the burden of persuasion onto the employer in every claim
filed by an employee. This is true because, instead of stating that an employee
must prove his/her claim by a preponderance of the evidence, the provision requires the "chosen manner of resolution" of a case be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, in order for the "chosen manner of resolution" to
be in favor of the employer, the employer must always produce a preponderance
of the evidence. This 28shifting
of the burden of persuasion is exactly what the
1
rule of liberality does.
The second part of the statute demands that the employee prevail whenever evidence is equally balanced, i.e., conflicting. This requirement is the essence of the rule of liberality. That is, the rule of liberality "dictates that the
claimant be given the benefit of all reasonable inferences the
record will allow;
282
claimant."
the
of
favor
in
resolved
be
must
and any conflicts
In the final analysis, West Virginia Code sections 23-1-1(b) & 23-4I g(b) abolished the rule of liberality in form, while West Virginia Code section
23-4-lg(a) resurrected the substance of the rule of liberality.

281

See the discussion on burden shifting in Part VII, supra.

282

Javins v. Workers' Comp. Comm'r, 320 S.E.2d 119, 130 (W.Va. 1984). See also Workman

v. Workmen's Comp. Conm'r, 236 S.E.2d 236 (W. Va. 1977); Myers v. State Workmen's Comp.
Comm'r, 239 S.E.2d 124 (W. Va. 1977); Pennington v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 175
S.E.2d 440 (W. Va. 1970); McGeary v. State Comp. Dir., 135 S.E.2d 345 (W. Va. 1964); Demastes v. State Comp. Comm'r, 165 S.E. 667 (W. Va. 1932).
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IX. CONCLUSION

The West Virginia legislature displayed commendable political courage
in the 1990's, when it enacted necessary sweeping fiscal reform measures designed to extend workers' compensation to future generations. The reforms of
the 1990's failed primarily because the legislature left the judicially imposed
rule of liberality intact. In 2003 the legislature again summoned the political will
to enact legislation to keep the system operating for future generations. In doing
so, the legislature expressly abolished the use of the rule of liberality in workers'
compensation litigation. Unfortunately, the legislature also expressly mandated
the use of the essence of the rule of liberality in resolving disputes. Undoubtedly
the legislature did not understand how the rule of liberality operates and, as a
result, we believe that the 2003 fiscal reform measures will suffer the same fate
as the reform measures of the 1990's.
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